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introduction 
More than two decades ago, in attempting to make sense of the structural 
dissonance between copyright and free expression, the U.S. Supreme Court 
famously declared that copyright was intended to be “the engine of free 
expression.”1 Ironically, this characterization was at the time intended as little 
more than a rhetorical device. In that very case, the Court proceeded 
immediately thereafter to analyze copyright as a “marketable” property right 
and conclude that absent a showing of market failure, neither fair use nor the 
First Amendment would preclude a finding of infringement.2 Instead of 
injecting a new set of values into copyright analysis, the “engine of free 
expression” metaphor served to effectively downplay the extent to which the 
value frameworks underlying the two systems could ever come into conflict 
with each other. Indeed, later opinions too have used it precisely to this end.3 
Despite its origins, Neil Netanel has long believed that there may yet be 
some merit in the Court’s characterization.4 In his view, copyright is a state 
mechanism directed at enhancing the “democratic character of civil society.”5 
By providing creators with an incentive to produce creative expression, 
supporting expressive activity via the market, and setting limits to private 
control of creative expression, copyright contributes directly to the 
development of a vibrant civil society.6 Netanel’s “democratic paradigm” 
stands in contrast to both the market-based and minimalist accounts of 
copyright and attempts to take seriously copyright’s ability to be an engine of 
free expression.7 
 
1.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
2.  Id. at 559. 
3.  The most recent instance is the Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 
(2003), through which the Court effectively immunized copyright legislation from First 
Amendment scrutiny, relying on this observation from its earlier holding in Harper & Row. 
A notable exception is the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1188 
(10th Cir. 2007). 
4.  See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 341 
(1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Democratic Civil Society] (setting up a theory that gives effect to 
the statement). Netanel does seem deeply skeptical of the simplistic invocation of the 
metaphor nonetheless. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, First Amendment Skein] 
(cautioning against the “talismanic invocation” of the metaphor). 
5.  Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 4, at 288. 
6.  Id. at 347-63. 
7.  Id. at 288-89. 
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For the last several decades, however, the analysis of copyright law has 
come to be dominated by the traditional law and economics account of the 
institution.8 In this account, copyright exists to provide creators with an 
incentive to produce creative expression and to ensure that the expression so 
produced is efficiently allocated through the market.9 Copyright thus provides 
creators with a property right in their creative expression, and given the 
centrality of strong property rights to the efficient functioning of the market, 
stronger copyright is thought to be efficiency enhancing. Netanel’s prior work 
directly targeted this economic account of copyright, which he termed the 
“neoclassicist approach,” by emphasizing that copyright as an institution was 
“in, but not of, the market.”10 
In his new book, Copyright’s Paradox, Netanel further develops his 
democracy-enhancing approach to copyright law, attempting to remake 
copyright in the “First Amendment’s image.”11 This time though, his target is 
not the nuanced economic account, but rather the systematic use of property 
rhetoric and propertarian ideas to understand and justify copyright’s major 
expansions—the trend toward what he characterizes pejoratively as 
“proprietary copyright” or “Blackstonian copyright.”12 
Across different areas of the law, the idea of property has time and again 
proven to be immensely powerful in furthering a particular conception of an 
issue and thereby influencing change along a desired dimension.13 William 
Blackstone’s legendary characterization of the right to property as a “sole and 
despotic dominion”14 has proven to be particularly useful in this process, by 
helping to conjure up images of an owner’s absolute and unconditional right to 
 
8.  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Fair Use]; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Inquiry]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
9.  E.g., Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1604 (“[T]he copyright system creates private 
property in creative works so that the market can simultaneously provide economic 
incentives for authors and disseminate authored works . . . .”). 
10.  Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 4, at 306, 364. 
11.  NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 195 (2008). 
12.  Id. at 7. Netanel uses these terms interchangeably throughout the book. See, e.g., id. at 151, 
153. In this Review, I will use the term “Blackstonian copyright” to avoid confusion. 
13.  See generally Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129 (1998). 
14.  See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
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exclude others from a resource.15 Scholars have long debated the extent to 
which Blackstone himself believed in this version of property, with most 
concluding that he intended it as little more than a functional metaphor.16 Yet, 
it has had significant influence over time, with the absolutism inherent in it 
having lent itself perfectly to a noninstrumental view of ownership and, in the 
process, to a vision of property rights and ownership as universally necessary 
ends in themselves, commonly characterized as “property essentialism.”17 
Copyright law is no exception. Since its entitlement bundle consists of a set 
of exclusive use privileges protected by a coextensive right to exclude (much 
like tangible property), copyright is commonly characterized as a form of 
property.18 But unlike tangible property, where an owner’s exclusive use 
privileges are presumptively infinite, copyright limits a creator’s exclusive 
privileges to those connected to the work, in turn representative of its 
underlying purpose. The perfunctory invocation of property rhetoric often 
glosses over this nuance. Yet, once copyright is characterized as a form of 
property, the noninstrumentalism of ownership is considered an end in itself, 
allowing for the scope of its exclusive privileges and exclusionary right to be 
extended with little regard for its underlying purpose. In Copyright’s Paradox, 
Netanel rightly identifies this essentialism as central to copyright’s recent 
expansionist trend.19 
Copyright’s Paradox does an exemplary job of setting up the copyright/free 
expression tension in the context of the democratic paradigm. Netanel 
systematically lays out recent instances of copyright expansion where the 
conflict has been most apparent and traces them to uses and modalities of 
property thinking that are often well concealed within doctrine. Building on 
the idea of copyright as a democracy-enhancing mechanism, the book makes a 
convincing argument that copyright can continue to serve as an engine of free 
expression notwithstanding the emergence of the Internet and with it new 
technologies of distribution that allow for expressive content to be shared, 
transformed, and copied with ease.20 
 
15.  See Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 
67 (1985). 
16.  See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 
631 (1998) (“[P]roperty as exclusive dominion is at most a cartoon or trope . . . .”). 
17.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734 (1998) 
(characterizing Blackstone as the “patron saint” of property essentialism). 
18.  For a particularly vocal defense of the idea, see Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005). 
19.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 6. 
20.  Id. at 81-108. 
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Having (1) elaborated on his vision for copyright (the democratic 
paradigm), (2) described the main impediment to its realization (copyright’s 
expansion and its conflict with free speech), and (3) identified the principal 
source of the problem (the proprietary vision of copyright), Netanel then 
proceeds to lay out a remedial “blueprint” to allow for copyright to be recast in 
the “First Amendment’s image.”21 It is here that his proposals seem 
surprisingly unambitious and perhaps more importantly, do not offer an 
alternative to the source of the problem: the propertarian vision. 
Copyright expansionism has certainly gone too far, and property rhetoric 
has no doubt played a major role in this. Yet, Netanel’s proposals seem to do 
little to minimize the influence of property essentialism within copyright. They 
focus principally on moving copyright away from its reliance on exclusionary 
remedies to systems for remunerating creators without altering its underlying 
entitlement structure in any way. With property ideas being as well entrenched 
in all of copyright thinking as Netanel tells us they are, what copyright needs, if 
indeed it is to serve its purpose as an engine of free expression, is a viable 
structural alternative to propertarian thinking. A large part of the reason why 
the essentialist rhetoric has continued to dominate is precisely because its 
critics are hard-pressed to offer such an alternative. 
An alternative to property essentialism in copyright law need not require 
accepting a “minimalist” approach, or indeed seeking to “overly truncate[]” 
copyright.22 But it would entail a structural recognition that the copyright 
grant differs significantly from that of other tangible and intangible property 
rights. Copyright differs from other forms of exclusive rights (including 
patents and trademarks) in that the existence of a creator’s entitlement and its 
scope are only ever determined judicially and correlatively—that is, in reference 
to a defendant’s actions. The absence of an administrative agency overseeing a 
formal grant process means that it falls entirely to courts to both delineate and 
enforce a creator’s entitlement during an infringement action. Copyright law 
thus closely resembles the common law process of adjudication, where the 
existence and violation of an entitlement are determined purposively, by 
reference to an underlying policy or objective; circumstantially, in the context 
of the parties before the court; and additionally, ex post. Taking these 
attributes seriously and understanding copyright to be a strongly conditional 
common law entitlement wherein courts balance a host of competing interests 
before making a finding, I argue in Part IV, is likely to move copyright away 
 
21.  See id. at 12. 
22.  Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 4, at 339. 
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from its reliance on property as a structural ideal, allowing it to realize its role 
as an engine of free expression unimpeded by property essentialism. 
Part I begins by examining Netanel’s real target in Copyright’s Paradox: 
Blackstonian copyright. Section I.A starts by setting out the application of 
Blackstonian rhetoric to property and copyright. Section I.B analyzes Netanel’s 
claims that the use of Blackstonian rhetoric in copyright is responsible for 
copyright’s recent expansions by looking to the modalities by which property 
thinking operates. Part II then lays out Netanel’s democratic paradigm for 
copyright law and analyzes his argument that copyright can and does function 
as an engine of free expression, even in the wake of the Internet and digital 
distribution. The strength of Netanel’s theory, this Part argues, lies in its 
repostulation of values traditionally considered ends in themselves as 
mechanisms contributing toward an exogenous end—free expression. The next 
Part analyzes the ways in which Netanel sees copyright as burdening free 
speech, looking specifically in Section III.A to the ways in which Blackstonian 
property essentialism has contributed to that process. Section III.B then 
evaluates his proposals to alleviate those burdens to conclude that they fail to 
adequately address the very cause of the problem that he ably identifies. Part IV 
outlines an alternative vision for copyright: a common law based structural 
understanding of the institution; one that would effectively minimize reliance 
on property essentialist rhetoric and ideas to explain its entitlement structure. 
i .  blackstone,  property,  and copyright 
What motivates much of Netanel’s analysis and argument in Copyright’s 
Paradox is the recognition that over the last decade or so, copyright has 
expanded significantly, to the extent that it today imposes an “unacceptable 
burden” on the values of free speech.23 Netanel’s project in the book is 
therefore to set out the problems that this expansion poses for free speech and 
to prescribe a solution connected to the democracy-enhancing features that he 
identifies for copyright. All the same, he also makes unambiguously clear what 
he believes is the “primary” and “immediate” cause for the expansion.24 He 
makes the cause a theme that runs through his entire analysis and in 
opposition to which he sets up his solutions. 
What, then, is this cause? The target he identifies is the increasing reliance 
on property essentialist rhetoric in copyright analysis. Copyright, he notes, is 
increasingly viewed as a form of conventional property, worthy of protection 
 
23.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 5. 
24.  Id. at 6. 
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independent of any underlying reasons for which it was brought into existence. 
He associates this version of property talk with Blackstone’s now infamous 
observation that the right of property consisted in the “sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises . . . in total exclusion of the 
right of any other individual in the universe.”25 As Netanel observes early in the 
book, 
 
Property rhetoric, whether invoked reflexively or strategically, has 
tended to support a vision of copyright as a foundational entitlement, 
a broad “sole and despotic dominion” over each and every possible use 
of a work rather than a limited government grant narrowly tailored to 
serve a public purpose. . . . And courts brand as “theft” any 
unauthorized use of a copyright holder’s work . . . .26 
 
What exactly is this rhetoric, and why has it proven to be particularly 
impactful in different areas including copyright law, giving rise to what 
Netanel describes as “Blackstonian copyright”? How has it contributed to 
copyright’s recent expansion? In this Part, I attempt to answer these questions. 
A. The Sole and Despotic Dominion in Perspective: Property Essentialism 
By most accounts, when Blackstone defined property as the sole and 
despotic dominion of its owners, he was far from advocating a form of 
property absolutism. As legal historians have pointed out, Blackstone’s own 
description of property doctrine of the time did not reflect this definition.27 Yet 
ironically, the Blackstonian idea of property is commonly associated with his 
definition, rather than his actual description of the subject. 
Blackstone’s definition though has proven over the years to be particularly 
powerful as a metaphor or trope.28 Quite apart from its imagery of property as 
an absolute entitlement—allowing for a limitless exercise of the right to 
exclude—it has also permeated contemporary legal analysis by lending itself to 
a version of property rhetoric that values property’s right to exclude 
 
25.  2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *2; see NETANEL, supra note 11, at 7. 
26.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 7. 
27.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1996); 
Burns, supra note 15, at 81-82; David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 105 (2009). Netanel notes this irony as well in his discussion 
of the Blackstonian idea of property. See NETANEL, supra note 11, at 220 n.11. 
28.  See Rose, supra note 16, at 601-02. 
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independent of its underlying rationale. The idea of property as despotic 
dominion that is often associated with Blackstone’s definition then denotes two 
somewhat interconnected elements. The first is the idea that property has no 
limits: absolutism. The second is the idea that once an entitlement is 
designated as a form of property, its owner is allowed to exercise the 
exclusionary privilege/right that is central to it, regardless of any underlying 
reason: essentialism. It is indeed the latter that has proven to be particularly 
impactful in the copyright context. 
Noted property theorist Jim Harris refers to this idea as the “irreducibility 
of ownership.”29 Ownership over a resource—that is, having a property right in 
it—is often thought to give its owner an open-ended set of ownership 
privileges, all or any of which may be exercised with little regard for an 
underlying principle or purpose. An owner may thus decide to use his resource 
in a way that is clearly inefficient, wasteful, or indeed completely inexplicable.30 
Yet in each of these situations, the fact that the resource and the reasons for 
action are characterized as “the owner’s” is all that matters. Once the law 
designates something as property, the law’s reasons for the designation cease to 
matter. Property thereafter exists for its own sake. No further inquiry into the 
reasons for the owner’s privileges or ownership is merited.31 The despotism 
that Blackstone alludes to connects perfectly with this idea. 
Central to the essentialist claim is therefore a belief that the reasons 
underlying a property right are irrelevant. And to be sure, in the context of 
tangible property, they usually are irrelevant. Thus, an owner’s decision to 
paint his house purple, or to scribble on the hood of his car, is not commonly 
analyzed beyond ascertaining that the decision was indeed the owner’s.32 To 
the extent that the question whether someone is actually an owner is made an 
issue, it usually revolves around issues of procedure—whether he acquired title 
appropriately—rather than purpose—why this person should be the owner. 
In her seminal work analyzing the various rhetorical strategies that employ 
Blackstone’s metaphor, Carol Rose characterizes the idea of the sole and 
despotic dominion as the “Exclusivity Axiom” and notes that it is “powerfully 
suggestive” because it delegates the decision of whether to exclude someone 
 
29.  J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 64 (1996). 
30.  Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005) (noting courts’ 
hostility toward recognizing and enforcing an owners’ unfettered right to destroy his or her 
property). 
31.  See HARRIS, supra note 29, at 65 (“If he may use, abuse, exploit, or transmit in these and 
countless other less eccentric ways, it is because he is owner.”). 
32.  Id. 
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from a resource to a property owner.33 As she notes, “This decisionmaking 
authority is what makes property a central libertarian value: The property 
owner has a small domain of complete mastery, complete self-direction, and 
complete protection from the whims of others.”34 Very importantly though, 
she also notes that one of the characteristic features of the Exclusivity Axiom 
involves its masking the underlying distribution of entitlements and the 
reasons (or indeed the complete absence of reasons) for the distribution.35 The 
metaphor of despotism thus aptly emphasizes the “indifference” of exclusion 
toward the underlying distribution, its legitimacy, and its reasons.36 
While Blackstone never used the sole and despotic dominion idea directly 
in his discussion of copyright, he clearly seems to have believed that authors 
were entitled to property rights in their creations—rights that were indifferent 
to any underlying purpose.37 In addition, he does seem to have believed in 
some variant of the essentialist logic applying to copyright. He thus observes, 
in his description of copyright, 
 
When a man by the exertion of his rational powers has produced an 
original work, he has clearly a right to dispose of that identical work as 
he pleases, and any attempt to take it from him, or vary the disposition 
he has made of it, is an invasion of his right of property.38 
 
Regardless of whether Blackstone actually believed in an absolutist 
conception of property, his understanding of copyright has clear essentialist 
overtones. His somewhat abbreviated discussion of the subject seems to hint at 
copyright being a form of common law property, consisting of an open-ended 
set of exclusionary privileges to be treated largely analogously to ordinary 
tangible property.39 Once copyright is classified in this conception as a form of 
 
33.  Rose, supra note 16, at 604; see also Louise A. Halper, Tropes of Anxiety and Desire: Metaphor 
and Metonymy in the Law of Takings, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 31, 57 (1996) (describing the 
influence of the metaphor on the Court’s takings jurisprudence). 
34.  Rose, supra note 16, at 604. 
35.  Id. at 605. 
36.  Id. (“[I]t is the axiom’s very indifference toward specific distributions that triggers the 
Ownership Anxiety.”). 
37.  See NETANEL, supra note 11, at 7; Hannibal Travis, Comment, Pirates of the Information 
Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 
782-83 (2000). 
38.  2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *405-06. 
39.  To be sure, Blackstone’s discussion draws a distinction between common law copyright and 
statutory copyright, with the latter being recognized to be of finite duration. See id. at *407. 
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property, it is thought to give its holder, the owner, a set of privileges 
exercisable completely independent of both the nature of the underlying 
subject matter of the right and the purpose that motivated its conferral to begin 
with. 
The term “Blackstonian copyright” is thus a reference not just to 
Blackstone’s own views on copyright—no doubt limited by the system and 
conceptions of it that existed at the time—but to the idea of property essentialism 
that is at the core of copyright. While often confused with the idea of property 
absolutism that is commonly associated with Blackstone’s definition, copyright 
remains somewhat distinct. Now to be sure, very often property absolutism 
and essentialism are mutually reinforcing; that is, the ownership interest is 
deemed absolute because it is agnostic to any underlying purpose. Yet the ideas 
remain analytically distinct. And it is precisely this characteristic that is at the 
heart of copyright’s recent expansions.40 
B. Blackstonian Copyright and Copyright’s Ungainly Expansion 
How, exactly, then does the idea of property essentialism that is at the heart 
of Blackstonian copyright relate to copyright’s expansion in recent times? In 
describing the link between propertarian thinking and copyright expansion, 
Netanel makes an interesting observation. He notes that copyright’s recent 
expansion in duration and scope is at once both a consequence of and a cause 
for the view that copyright is just like any other property right.41 He 
characterizes this a “vicious cycle.”42 
This causal reflexivity that Netanel identifies, is particularly intriguing 
because it reveals how property is in some ways a self-reinforcing idea. On the 
 
Yet Blackstone believed that the source of the rights—individual authorship—remained the 
same in both and consequently that copyright derived its source outside of any statutory 
grant, much like tangible property. This latter position was reflected most aptly in his 
arguments that the creation of statutory copyright did not abrogate analogous protection 
under the common law. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF 
COPYRIGHT 89-91 (1993); see also Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, 
Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 231 (discussing 
how “statutory amendments gradually added new entitlements to copyright protection” that 
were not protected by existing statutes or common law). 
40.  To be sure, Netanel’s arguments do not rely on the essentialism/absolutism distinction, and 
it seems that at times his conception of Blackstonian copyright entails both. Yet I believe 
that in the copyright context absolutism originates in an essentialist view of property and is 
therefore incomplete as a causal basis for the expansion. 
41.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 55. 
42.  Id. 
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one hand, property ideas contribute to doctrinal expansion through their 
essentialism. Yet on the other hand, when copyright law expands 
independently and comes to closely resemble traditional property, it tends to 
be equated with other forms of property. When this happens, the expansion 
symbolically contributes to a propertarian vision of copyright. 
Even accepting this causal reflexivity, why indeed is it that propertarian 
thinking is the “primary” and indeed “immediate” cause for copyright’s recent 
expansions? The answer, one suspects, derives from the way in which property 
ideas and metaphors effectively mask the tradeoff between conflicting 
institutional objectives by presenting themselves as nonideological and 
therefore noncontestable realities.43 As a consequence, even when other causal 
factors are at play in copyright’s expansion, property rhetoric, of the essentialist 
variety, enters the picture to give the argument an air of legitimacy. This is 
certainly true of the other causes that Netanel identifies in the book and 
elsewhere.44 Thus, entertainment industry rent seeking is routinely couched as 
a demand for “protection against theft.” And courts, no less, have fallen prey to 
this approach, not just in their rhetoric but also as part of their doctrinal 
analysis.45 Just as an owner of a tangible resource is thought to have an open-
ended set of use privileges associated with the resource, a copyright holder is 
deemed entitled to control any market for uses of the work through the grant 
or denial of a license. The causal primacy and immediacy of the propertarian 
vision therefore derive from its ubiquity in all areas of the copyright system. 
Additionally, on a theoretical level, property essentialist rhetoric forces 
copyright law and policy to elide the centrality of the incentives-access tradeoff, 
a defining feature of intellectual property analysis since the seminal work of 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow in the 1960s.46 Since the 
subject matter of protection in copyright (and all of intellectual property) is a 
nonrival, nonexcludable public good, resource exclusivity—the incentive for 
creativity—is imposed artificially through legal rules that attempt to mimic the 
functioning of tangible property systems. All the same, this exclusivity comes 
at a cost, represented by the static and dynamic inefficiencies associated with 
 
43.  For more on this phenomenon in structuring legal arguments see Hanoch Dagan, The 
Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138, 150 (1999). 
44.  See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 11, at 7; Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? 
Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 
2007). 
45.  See infra text accompanying notes 56-60. 
46.  See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962). 
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monopoly control over an otherwise nonexcludable resource. Consequently, all 
of intellectual property, including copyright, revolves around identifying the 
point at which this balance is optimized—that is, the monopoly costs 
associated with the artificial exclusivity are outweighed by its incentivizing 
benefits.47 While tangible property rights also come with their own set of 
inefficiencies, by all accounts the costs associated with intellectual property 
rights far outweigh those attributable to tangible property rights.48 And as a 
direct result, calibrating the scope and extent of the grant of exclusivity to 
account for these significantly higher costs remains a core concern in the 
intellectual property context, in a way that it just is not in the tangible world. 
The power of essentialist rhetoric therefore lies in its giving short shrift to the 
importance of this tradeoff. When the law does not care if I deny you 
permission to walk across my front yard on your way to work, why should it 
now when I deny you permission to use parts of my song in a documentary? 
They are both mine and since my ownership interest in the land is 
presumptively agnostic to the inefficiencies of requiring you to walk around my 
front yard, my ownership in the song should be too. 
To be sure though, it is not always clear when property ideas are a cause 
and when they are a consequence. In some situations the presence of 
exogenous influences and reasons certainly hints at the propertarian analogy 
being a consequence rather than a cause. Take copyright’s expansion in 
duration that Netanel describes.49 With the term of protection now extending 
to the life of the author plus seventy years,50 the duration is certainly 
“functionally perpetual.”51 Yet the property analogy here comes in at the back 
end, rather than at the front; it does not directly drive the expansion. 
Copyright’s term extension was at each juncture, justified independently as 
deriving from copyright’s system of providing creators with an incentive to 
create and distribute.52 Property essentialism seems to have been neither the 
direct nor the immediate contributor to the expansion along this dimension. 
All the same, a seemingly never-ending term certainly contributes to a vision of 
 
47.  For a general overview of the idea in the copyright context, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996). 
48.  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 21 (2003) (noting that intellectual property rights tend to be more costly in 
several ways than other rights in physical property). 
49.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 57-58. 
50.  See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
51.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 58. 
52.  The most recent iteration of this argument was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). See NETANEL, supra note 11. 
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copyright as just any other form of property and by symbolizing this, gives rise 
to a set of norms that countenance this vision.53 
This is in contrast to the other major substantive expansion that Netanel 
identifies: copyright’s expansion in scope.54 Copyright’s modern tests for 
infringement seemingly exclude very little. Tests such as “total concept and 
feel” or “substantial similarity” allow copyright’s entitlement bundle to reach 
beyond what it was traditionally meant to cover—creative expression.55 The 
vagueness of copyright’s internal doctrinal limits, including the idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use has further contributed to this. The influence of 
essentialist rhetoric on copyright, however, is best seen in what Netanel 
describes as the property-centered approach to fair use.56 
Of the four factors that courts employ as part of the fair use analysis, the 
last requires them to look to the effect of the defendant’s use on “the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”57 In interpreting this 
requirement, though, courts have counterintuitively defined the “potential 
market” to include a market for licensed uses of the work.58 In this broad 
understanding, just about any use to which the work is put is likely to have a 
negative impact on the market for the work, with the result that fair use is 
often denied.59 This rather amorphous definition of the “market” for the 
protected work originates directly in essentialist thinking. Recall that 
essentialism emphasizes the indifference of the property entitlement toward 
the reasons that underlie it. A property owner is deemed to have an exclusive 
 
53.  The most well known of these norms is often described as the “clearance culture”—a 
phenomenon whereby users of a work protected by copyright automatically presume that 
their use falls within the copyright holder’s bundle of exclusive rights and focus on 
obtaining a license from the holder for the use. This in turn fuels holders’ and indeed courts’ 
conception of the copyright bundle as all-encompassing. For an excellent study of this 
phenomenon, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-906 (2007). For more on the clearance culture phenomenon, see 
Peter Jaszi & Patricia Aufderheide, Untold Stories: Collaborative Research on Documentary 
Filmmakers’ Free Speech and Fair Use, 46 CINEMA J. 133 (2007). 
54.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 58. 
55.  Id. at 60. 
56.  Id. at 64. 
57.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
58.  For a discussion of this phenomenon, see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][5], at 13-202.2 (2008); Gibson, supra note 53, at 895-98; Mark A. 
Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, 
at 185, 190; and Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 903-
04 (2007). 
59.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 64. 
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right to do whatever he or she wants to a resource simply by virtue of owning 
it, regardless of whether the right and the actions connect to the reasons for the 
ownership. In similar fashion, once an original work of expression is created 
and it is found to be the subject matter of copyright protection, the essentialist 
view considers the creator to be vested with exclusive rights over all possible 
uses to which the work may be put, however, again ignoring the purpose for 
which the entitlement exists. The idea of a market for licensed uses does 
precisely this. 
The third major form of copyright expansion that Netanel discusses 
represents in many ways the crystallization of the Blackstonian conception of 
copyright—the emergence of “paracopyright.”60 The emergence of digital 
encryption and other technological control measures coupled with the 
enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) now allow 
copyright owners to effectively regulate access to expression. With the law 
imposing liability for the circumvention of such measures, and indeed the very 
manufacture and distribution of technologies capable of such circumvention, 
copyright owners are equipped with both a legal and a technological 
mechanism to control all access to their expression.61 Unlike even traditional 
copyright, the system of liability here is not even subject to limited exceptions 
akin to the fair use doctrine. 
Largely analogous to this process, Netanel notes, is the use of one-click 
licenses that make access to expression conditional upon an acceptance of terms 
and conditions that impose property-like exclusionary restrictions on uses of 
the expression.62 These licenses effectively make every person accessing the 
expression a party to a contract with its creator, thereby subjecting him or her 
to its underlying terms, which courts and contract law remain perfectly willing 
to enforce.63 The process then effectively blurs the well-known distinction 
between property and contract that the law has always adhered to, and 
converts contractual restrictions into property-like ones.64 
 
60.  Id. at 66. For a discussion of how this crystallizes the propertization of copyright, see Randal 
C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the 
Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2003). 
61.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
62.  See NETANEL, supra note 11, at 70. 
63.  For an elaborate overview of how this effectively expands copyright’s scope and restricts the 
applicability of its limits, see David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The 
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999). 
64.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) (elaborating on why the legal system uses property and contract 
as two distinct modalities for allocating rights). 
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The primary impetus for these developments, however, was not 
propertarian thinking, but rather the easy availability and diffusion of 
technological mechanisms that enabled them as a functional matter.65 Digital 
locks now enabled nonexcludable expression to be converted into a partially 
excludable commodity;66 clickwrap enabled the imposition of additional 
exclusionary restrictions on uses. Yet once this happened, the propertarian 
(that is, essentialist) vision of copyright effectively coalesced with this 
functional reality, giving it legal significance. If copyright owners could as a 
technological matter exercise near-complete control over their expression—
something that sits rather well with the idea of them owning their expression—
the law too should facilitate such ownership, or so the argument goes. 
What is perhaps most interesting about these three forms of copyright 
expansion is the different roles that propertarian thinking played in each 
process. In one, relating to its scope, its influence on the law was direct and 
causal. Yet in the other two, it played a less direct but nonetheless equally 
important role. In the context of duration, its impact one might say was largely 
structural. Propertarian thinking here emerged as a consequence of 
nonproprietary, yet ill-conceived, structural changes that made copyright 
resemble tangible property structurally, thereby symbolically reinforcing the 
essentialist rhetoric. To be sure, term extensions certainly do have functional 
significance, yet their principal impact, at least in their more recent iterations, 
is structural.67 This is in contrast to copyright’s expansions in the area of 
paracopyright, where the law reinforced the propertarian vision functionally, 
by legitimizing and indeed encouraging a practice that originated in essentialist 
logic. Thus, through a mix of causal, structural, and functional influences, 
property thinking has certainly remained central to almost all of copyright’s 
recent expansions. 
Indeed the final two instances of expansion that Netanel describes each 
reveal a convergence of these modalities. The first relates to noncommercial 
personal uses, which were until recently exempt from copyright infringement, 
 
65.  See Picker, supra note 60, at 282-83. 
66.  See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2065-66 (2000). 
67.  This perhaps explains why the constitutional challenge to copyright’s most recent extension, 
contained in the Copyright Term Extension Act, was brought as a facial challenge rather 
than as an as-applied one in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 186 (2003). This also may have 
been the reason why the Court was not ready to invalidate the extension, absent a showing 
of functional harm resulting from the extension. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 229-
30 (2004). 
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either de jure or de facto.68 Here, the expansion of infringement to cover any 
use to which the expression is put (a causal influence), and the reality that 
copyright owners can indeed regulate such uses as a practical matter (a 
functional influence) are combining to result in a large number of users today 
coming to recognize all forms of private copying to be a form of infringement 
(symbolic reinforcement). The second is the stifling of new media through the 
rampant use of exclusionary remedies such as injunctions.69 With the 
copyright holder’s entitlement being viewed as a full-blown property right, it 
has indeed become customary for courts to recognize permanent injunctive 
relief to be not just the default, but rather the only remedy upon a finding of 
infringement. Rarely ever do courts award damages in lieu of an injunction. 
Here, the influence of essentialist thinking is rather direct and causal. Since 
copyright holders own their expression, they should be allowed to give effect to 
the right to exclude that is central to the idea of property by excluding 
infringing uses altogether, and courts readily accede.70 
Netanel thus makes a compelling argument that propertarian thinking has 
contributed to copyright’s recent expansions in more ways than one. Often this 
influence is direct and strategic; yet in recent times it has become indirect and 
reflexive, thereby avoiding genuine scrutiny. 
i i .  the continuing relevance of the democratic paradigm 
Central to Copyright’s Paradox is Netanel’s argument that the “engine of 
free expression” metaphor continues to remain a functional ideal for copyright 
law and policy even in the digital era, with the advent of new technologies of 
distribution. In recognition of the innumerable sociotechnological changes that 
have occurred over the last decade or so, Netanel offers a significantly qualified 
account of the democratic paradigm in contrast to his earlier work.71 All the 
same, he builds on its core ideas. 
In his account, Netanel identifies three principal functions for copyright, 
each of which he claims plays a role in underwriting our system of free 
expression—the production function, the structural function, and the 
 
68.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 72-75. 
69.  Id. at 75-78. 
70.  For more on this phenomenon, specifically on how exclusionary remedies contribute to a 
propertarian conception of a right, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To 
Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 
616, 628-29, 638-49 (2008). 
71.  See Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 4, at 341-64. 
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expressive function.72 Very importantly, though, his claims are not purely 
descriptive. He notes that each of the three functions ought to be used 
additionally as “metrics” against which copyright’s role in promoting free 
speech should be measured.73 They thus form focal points for his entire theory. 
As he notes, “They are also useful metrics for measuring the extent to which 
copyright actually furthers [the promotion of free speech]. They are tools for 
asking whether today’s copyright law, given its current configuration and the 
market and technological universe in which it operates, still serves as a vital 
‘engine of free expression.’”74 
This raises an important question. Is each of the functions identified for 
copyright a goal toward which the copyright system ought to independently 
aspire, or is each a goal because it in turn contributes to the system of free 
expression? If the former, the theory then needs to additionally tell us why 
these goals are independently desirable—a selection issue—and their 
contribution to the free speech system becomes a descriptive “extra” rather 
than a normative necessity. But if the latter, they cease to be viable independent 
measures. Netanel’s answer seems to be a mix of both. On the face of it, 
Netanel’s arguments appear to convert what are traditionally presumed to be 
copyright’s independently desirable ends into mechanisms directed at an 
exogenous structural end. At the same time though, he injects the mechanisms 
with independent normative content, by arguing that they can function as 
metrics in the analysis. He thus seems to suggest that the functions he 
identifies should be read as both means and ends in the analysis. I use this 
parameter to run through each of them. 
A. Beyond Incentives: The Production Function 
Copyright’s “production function,” according to Netanel, derives from its 
ability to act as an incentive for the creation and distribution of creative 
expression.75 Through the grant of an exclusive right, copyright attempts to 
solve the public goods problems of nonexcludability and nonrivalry associated 
with original expression, inducing creators to produce and disseminate 
expressive content.76 In Copyright’s Paradox, however, Netanel offers a major 
qualification to his original position. He concedes that as a consequence of the 
 
72.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 81. 
73.  Id. at 82. 
74.  Id. at 81-82. 
75.  Id. at 84. 
76.  Id. at 84-85. 
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Internet and the emergence of numerous new technologies of decentralized 
distribution, creative expression today often is produced and distributed 
without any reliance on copyright’s incentive structure. Individuals generate 
and share content for a variety of motives independent of copyright and, 
additionally, can tap into extraneous revenue streams.77 
Having made this concession, Netanel argues that copyright nonetheless 
serves as an important incentive for works of authorship that involve a 
significant amount of time and resources to create, such as motion pictures, 
television programs, and the like. The production function in this variation is 
an argument about copyright’s “incremental free speech benefits,” related to its 
ability to induce creative expression beyond what would be produced 
independently—that is, without such protection.78 
The “incremental benefits” variant of the argument, as should be apparent, 
also builds on copyright’s theory of incentives.79 All the same, it attempts to do 
more than merely validate the idea of incentives. What it seems to do, however, 
is to convert the idea of a creative inducement, long thought to be an end in 
itself, into a mechanism directed at a new goal: furthering the system of free 
expression. Consequently, the production function is additionally dependent 
on whether the expression so produced has “independent First Amendment 
value.”80 Only if this additional condition is satisfied, argues Netanel, is the 
production function served. It is here that Netanel’s analysis might have 
provided a little more insight into his thinking. 
What are these independent First Amendment values? To Netanel, the idea 
of First Amendment values extends beyond First Amendment doctrine as 
interpreted and applied by judges. It covers what he identifies as “free speech 
principles,” a set of values and ideals that contribute to the widest 
 
77.  Id. at 86-88. 
78.  Id. at 88. 
79.  For an overview of copyright’s theory of incentives, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ex 
Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). 
80.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 88. As Netanel notes, “[W]e must posit that (1) the copyright 
incentive generates the creation and dissemination of original expression over and above the 
rich array of speech that would be available even without copyright, and (2) this additional, 
copyright-incented expression has independent First Amendment value.” Id. It is worth 
mentioning that Netanel’s original formulation of the production function in his prior work 
contained no such limit. See Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 4, at 350 (“It bears 
emphasizing that the constitutive role of copyrightable creative expression in a democratic 
civil society is limited neither to works of authorship that explicitly address matters of 
political or social importance nor to those that present ideas in a rationally apprehensible 
manner.”). 
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dissemination of information from diverse sources.81 It values the negative 
liberty of the First Amendment but is more empowering than that, and 
emphasizes both expressive autonomy and expressive diversity as valuable 
ends.82 
What Netanel does not tell us, though, is how and when expression 
dependent on copyright’s incentive structure furthers these values. To begin 
with, it is not clear how or why the fact that the incentive produces some 
expression does not by itself have such value, given how widely the idea seems 
to be understood. But this clearly is not all that is needed to satisfy the 
“independent” value argument, since that would make the condition seem 
superfluous. Netanel thus seems to envision some category of works that 
copyright manages to incentivize, but which do not independently satisfy a set 
of free speech principles.83 
It would have helped then to have examples of expressive works that fit the 
incentive theory, but fail the production function. This is particularly so given 
that Netanel rightly notes the emergence of works that are produced quite 
independent of copyright’s incentive structure. If this trend indeed continues, 
as some optimistically predict it will,84 the category of expressive works 
produced through copyright’s incentive structure—that is, “sustained works of 
authorship”85—will continue to become narrower and narrower, making 
Netanel’s twofold test for the production function even more important, and 
perhaps unduly exclusionary. 
B. Not Just Allocative Efficiency: The Structural Function 
Quite apart from providing creators with an incentive to produce and 
disseminate creative expression, copyright is thought to support a market-
 
81.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 35. 
82.  Id. at 35-42. 
83.  It is not clear either that Netanel favors a subjective content-based evaluation of works to 
measure their contribution to the free speech system as a condition to their protection via 
copyright. His detailing of categories covered seems wide enough to exclude such content-
based classification. Id. at 88-89. 
84.  See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 106 (2006); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The 
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 371, 375 (2002). 
85.  This is a term Netanel borrows from Jane Ginsburg to describe works of authorship that 
involve the investment of significant time and resources. See NETANEL, supra note 11, at 88; 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and 
Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1499 (1995). 
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based sector of creators and thereby underwrite an “expressive sector with 
roots outside the state.”86 It thus allows for creative expression to be 
disseminated via the market, minimizing the influence of both government and 
elite forces. Copyright’s structural function, as Netanel details it, is a complex 
and nuanced argument. 
Providing a brief structural history of the creative sector in the seventeenth 
century, Netanel notes how creative pursuits were intricately tied to the 
patronage system—dependent on the church, a monarchy, or an elite 
aristocracy for support. It was only in the eighteenth century that a market for 
such literary and artistic creativity began to emerge. Yet, even then the market 
was controlled by the government through licenses, which functioned as a 
system of censorship. Consequently, when conceptualizing copyright, the 
Framers were acutely aware of the perils of both the patronage and the 
government-controlled systems of support for creativity. To them, the 
copyright system was meant to maintain authors’ “fiscal independence” and 
result in a “national market” for their works.87 
Moving to the present, Netanel argues that this structural ideal still has 
merit in today’s world. Yet, he concedes that in light of recent technological 
developments, its impact is “more modest” and “incremental,” just as he does 
in the context of the production function.88 Notwithstanding the emergence of 
new distribution technologies such as peer communication and their role in 
disseminating news and information, traditional media such as news channels 
and newspapers, he argues, continue to possess significant value in a 
democracy—in acting as a powerful check on the government, in ensuring the 
authenticity and reliability of information, and in framing issues for public 
debate.89 
Netanel ties his argument for the structural function, in its incremental 
formulation, to an important distributive value: expressive diversity.90 He lays 
particular emphasis on the value of a “plurality” of media and models of 
discourse.91 It thus entails both an ideologically diverse output and a dispersal 
of “communicative power,” whereby the generators of diverse output are 
endowed with the power to have their opinions heard.92 Yet what is interesting 
 
86.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 89. 
87.  Id. at 89-92. 
88.  Id. at 93. 
89.  Id. at 94-99. 
90.  For a fuller discussion of Netanel’s conception of expressive diversity, see id. at 38-42. 
91.  Id. at 95. 
92.  Id. at 39-40. 
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about the structural function is Netanel’s argument that copyright represents a 
reliance on the market to attain these distributive ends, a claim that has a 
distinctive libertarian undertone. 
While the structural function is a claim about copyright being a democratic 
allocative mechanism whereby creators can invest in expressive works 
independent of both government and elite support, it differs from the frequent 
claim about the simple allocative efficiency of a market for creative works. It is 
an argument about creators who would otherwise not have found an outlet for 
their work being able now to use the market to finance their investment of time 
and resources into the creative process.93 The structural argument, as Netanel 
describes it, makes absolutely no claim about the market being the most 
efficient allocative mechanism. Rather, it claims the market is a 
nondiscriminatory outlet for certain kinds of creative expression.94 
This distinction seems to be particularly important in light of Netanel’s 
argument that copyright’s structural function contributes toward the free 
speech principle of expressive diversity. In numerous contexts, economists 
have posited that market-based pricing represents the most efficient way of 
ensuring greater diversity and variety in output.95 Netanel, on the other hand, 
does not seem to be arguing that the creation of a market for expressive works 
is indeed the most efficient way of ensuring expressive diversity. His argument 
is that it represents an additional outlet for expressive works, and that any 
additional expression, regardless of content and mode, is diversity 
enhancing.96 Thus understood, the fact that copyright structurally contributes 
to expressive diversity becomes a descriptive extra rather than an independent 
basis on which the validity of the argument rests. 
 
93.  For more on this argument, see Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in 
Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1540-42 (2005). 
94.  This distinction was reflected most aptly in his prior work, where he notes that the activities 
promoted by copyright comprise a system “in, but not of, the market” and that allocative 
efficiency is “a secondary consideration.” Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 4, at 
364. 
95.  Most recently, Christopher Yoo has made this argument in the context of the network 
neutrality debate. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 62 (2005) (arguing for a market-based system of “network diversity” to allow the 
heterogeneity of demands to coexist and be satisfied); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Network 
Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006) (advocating a “network 
diversity” approach to broadband policy instead of other alternatives). 
96.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 93-94. 
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C. Symbolic Reinforcement: The Expressive Function 
In identifying a third free speech enhancing function for copyright law—
the expressive function—Netanel breaks with his past work, which centered 
around the production and structural functions. Central to the idea of 
copyright’s expressive function is the notion that law plays a role in 
symbolically reinforcing certain values, independent of its ability to regulate 
behavior linked to those values.97 In different areas, scholars have long 
observed that laws and legal rules are often directed at “making statements” of 
a certain kind to mould a set of beliefs and understandings.98 Netanel builds on 
this body of work to argue that copyright law too contains a deep symbolism, 
one related to “our understanding of authorship and of the place of individual 
expression within our cultural and political matrix.”99 This, he notes, has three 
aspects to it. The first is its underscoring the importance of fresh ideas and 
contributions to public discourse, by valuing the development of distinctive 
expression. The second is its reinforcing the importance of individual 
expression to public deliberation in civil society, a republican understanding. 
The third is its connection to the ideal of progress and the diffusion of 
knowledge within society.100 
Yet actions can change the social meaning and symbolism associated with a 
law, and as Netanel notes, copyright is no exception. He thus notes that its 
“new meaning” differs from its old, and for copyright to serve its true 
expressive function, it needs to be recalibrated back to its original 
understanding.101 
While the idea of copyright’s expressive function is both novel and 
insightful, it clearly is not the most compelling of the free expression 
enhancing roles that Netanel identifies for copyright. This is so for two 
somewhat related reasons. 
 
97.  See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996). 
For examples of other work on the expressive function, see Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal 
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); and Richard H. Pildes, Why 
Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 725 (1998). See also Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical 
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (critically evaluating various expressive theories of 
law). 
98.  Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2024. 
99.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 105. 
100.  Id. at 105-06. 
101.  Id. at 107. 
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First, as some scholars have noted, the expressive function of a law is often 
hard to dissociate from its consequences.102 When a law directed at generating 
a certain norm via its expressive function in effect produces one with negative 
consequences, its independent expressive value merits closer scrutiny. Thus, 
while copyright may have been intended to make a statement about society’s 
commitment to autonomous expression, its role in public discourse and indeed 
its contribution to the diffusion of knowledge in society, the fact that today 
copyright has assumed “new meaning,” under which it is viewed as a 
hindrance to each of those values, should make us question our reliance on its 
expressive function as an independent reason for the law.103 The obvious 
response is that this new meaning is a result of modern developments and has 
no connection to the expressive function as communicated by the Framers 
originally. 
This leads to the second reason, which relates to the potential weakness of 
copyright’s expressive function and the resultant conflation of means and ends. 
In situations where the communication of a law’s expressive value is not clear 
and effective, the statement it often sends tends to confuse its intended goal 
with the means it employs to achieve that end. Take the case of a law that 
renders illegal a certain type of activity in the interests of an ideal such as 
“fairness” or “morality,” with the contours of that ideal remaining 
indeterminate. In such a situation, it is normal to expect individuals over time 
to understand the law’s communication to be no more than that “the activity in 
question is illegal.” When this happens, the illegality of the activity assumes a 
life of its own and can evolve in a direction completely opposite to the intended 
idea of “fairness.” Indeed, one might argue that this is precisely what has 
become of copyright.104 Copyright’s exclusive rights framework was meant to 
 
102.  See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2045-48. The two examples Sunstein provides are instructive. 
The first involves a law directed at reducing pollution by introducing a system of emissions 
trading. Here, an expressivist critic would object that the law has an adverse effect on social 
norms—that it effectively encourages polluting behavior by failing to stigmatize it. If the 
criticism were shown to be true, Sunstein argues, it might favor rejecting the law altogether. 
Id. at 2045-46. The second involves minimum wage laws. One might favor such laws as 
expressing society’s valuation of human labor at some predetermined level below which the 
wage is akin to an attack on the dignity of the laborer. Yet, if it can be shown that such laws 
actually contribute to greater unemployment among the classes of laborers they were 
intended to protect, Sunstein argues, the expressive account should not blind itself to 
consequences. Id. at 2046-47. 
103.  Netanel seems to concede that individuals view modern copyright along these lines. 
NETANEL, supra note 11, at 106 (“[I]t seems that copyright is increasingly perceived as a 
hindrance, if not a forbidding obstacle, to individual moral agency, contributions to public 
discourse, and self-expression.”). 
104.  See id. at 107. 
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express the law’s commitment toward a set of civic republican ideals and the 
value of autonomous expression within that setting. Yet the weakness of this 
expressive function resulted in the exclusive rights framework assuming an 
independent existence, with the result that copyright today conveys a 
completely different statement of its intended values. Even if copyright did 
express a commitment to a set of ideals, the fact that it has effectively 
“stray[ed] from that expressive meaning”105 may represent a weakness in its 
expressive structure, which in turn might give us reason to reconsider whether 
the expressive function is worth holding on to at all. 
Copyright may certainly have served an expressive function historically. As 
a descriptive argument then, the expressive function does seem plausible. Yet it 
is not nearly as convincing as a normative argument. Unlike the production 
and structural functions, which clearly have some applicability in today’s 
world, even if only incrementally,106 Netanel’s argument about copyright’s 
expressive function seems unduly idealized. 
i i i .  minimizing the burdens of blackstonian copyright 
Copyright can and does continue to underwrite the system of free 
expression. All the same, as Netanel notes early on, some tension between 
copyright and free speech is inevitable, a price to be paid for the overall 
speech-enhancing effects of the copyright system.107 He thus proceeds to set 
out the different ways in which copyright “burdens” free speech. In 
acknowledging that some of these free speech burdens are tolerable, Netanel’s 
analysis seems to focus on those more recent burdens that are entirely the 
result of copyright’s recent Blackstonian expansions.108 
The analysis does an impressive job of setting out the various forms in 
which the conflict between free speech and Blackstonian essentialism has 
played itself out in recent times. Yet, when it moves to describing ways in 
which this conflict can be minimized, it begins to move away from its sustained 
focus on the impact of Blackstonian thinking. If Blackstonian essentialism is 
indeed at the heart of copyright’s recent expansions and thereby responsible for 
the myriad “intolerable”109 burdens that copyright currently imposes on free 
 
105.  Id. at 106. 
106.  Interestingly, Netanel offers no similar qualification to the expressive function argument 
along similar lines. 
107.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at viii. 
108.  See id. at 109. 
109.  Id. 
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speech, should the aim not be to exorcise copyright of its essentialist 
influences? Netanel’s proposals, while certainly meaningful as an incremental 
reform package, are in this respect, seemingly inadequate. 
A. Blackstonian Copyright Versus Free Speech 
As a historical matter, copyright has always suppressed some amount of 
speech by preventing, at the very minimum, the verbatim copying of protected 
expression. But Blackstonian copyright does more than just that. It actively 
contributes to a set of norms that cumulatively discourage certain kinds of 
speech even when it is not readily apparent that copyright’s exclusionary 
mechanisms would extend to them. What Netanel describes as copyright’s 
“censorial speech burden[s]” thus focuses on the norms of deterrence and self-
censorship to which a proprietary vision of copyright have given rise.110 Given 
copyright’s expansion and the prevalent view that copyright’s entitlement 
package extends to every possible use to which an expressive work may be put, 
users who rely on such expression for their own expression and indeed 
intermediaries on whom they depend, routinely limit their own expressive 
output whenever they are led to believe that their actions would constitute 
infringement. The uncertainty of copyright’s reach is thus an overdeterrent 
rather than underdeterrent.111 
The censorial burden to which Blackstonian copyright gives rise is largely a 
product of the way in which the institution of property normally operates. 
Central to all of property is the idea that once a resource is privately owned, it 
gives its owner a right to exclude all others from the resource—a right that is to 
be understood by its imposing a duty on others to stay away from the resource 
or risk legal liability in the form of an action for trespass.112 It is this duty, 
which I describe elsewhere as the “norm of inviolability” that is responsible for 
individuals not walking across each other’s front yards, grabbing each other’s 
belongings in a subway train and the like.113 Self-exclusion from an identifiably 
owned resource thus defines the very way in which property as a social 
institution functions. It should thus come as no surprise then that the 
overdeterrence and self-censorship that Netanel describes are indeed 
distinctively propertarian influences. 
 
110.  Id. at 111. 
111.  Id. at 113-16. 
112.  See generally Balganesh, supra note 70 (arguing that the right to exclude derives from a norm 
of inviolability that originates in social morality). 
113.  Id. at 619-27. 
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Netanel’s next argument, though, that copyright often makes it 
prohibitively expensive for speakers to express themselves, does not connect as 
directly to property thinking.114 As Netanel reminds us, free speech does not 
mean costless speech, akin to the common mnemonic used by the free software 
movement “free as in freedom.”115 Consequently, the fact that speakers often 
have to pay something is not necessarily problematic. The argument he 
attempts to develop, however, is that they should not have to pay a prohibitive 
price, which would effectively deter and stifle their expression.116 While his 
argument does not tell us how and when to determine when a price is 
prohibitive other than through its ex post effects, it eventually concludes that 
current copyright owners do indeed routinely charge “supracompetitive prices” 
that are in turn prohibitive. To reach that conclusion, Netanel goes through 
several steps. 
Netanel begins by arguing that copyright, unlike other laws, is a form of 
speech regulation.117 Since copyright ownership bears on what he describes as 
speech distribution—that is, it encourages and promotes speech of a certain 
kind—it is thus directed at the very regulation of speech and expression in 
society.118 Copyright is thus principally a distributive mechanism, which 
“necessarily implicates fundamental normative questions about free speech 
policy regarding the desired balance between commercial and noncommercial 
expression and between wealthy and poor speakers.”119 In this conception, 
determining whether a cost is prohibitive is a context-specific inquiry involving 
a host of variables extrinsic to copyright. 
After what point then does the cost of copyright-protected expression 
become prohibitive? Netanel equates this with the “competitive price” for 
expression, which he argues is the average price required to recover the 
creator’s first-copy costs, plus any marginal costs.120 He also notes that 
 
114.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 116-17. 
115.  NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE: THE EFFECTS 
OF CYBERSPACE ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 64 (2004); see also SAM WILLIAMS, FREE 
AS IN FREEDOM: RICHARD STALLMAN’S CRUSADE FOR FREE SOFTWARE (2002) (describing this 
mnemonic as being central to the entire movement). 
116.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 116 (“Prohibitive license fees in fact are often (but not always) 
properly understood as an intolerable speech burden.”). 
117.  Id. at 117. Netanel has made a more elaborate version of this argument previously, 
characterizing copyright as a form of content-neutral speech regulation. See Netanel, First 
Amendment Skein, supra note 4, at 47-48. 
118.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 118-19. 
119.  Id. at 120. 
120.  Id. at 122, 125. 
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calculating this price additionally has to factor in the risk of failed efforts that 
creators take with every additional creative investment and that once creators’ 
entire portfolios (of failed and successful creations) are to be examined, the 
metric has to move from competitive pricing to competitive profits and their 
sources.121 Having made this move away from an objective measure, Netanel 
then tells us that it is impossible to ascertain the competitive price for a work 
without making “value judgments” about speech and expression: issues of free 
speech policy that are incapable of a priori determination.122 
Why then do we still believe that copyright imposes a prohibitive cost 
burden on speech? In short, the burden comes from (1) the ability of copyright 
holders to charge supracompetitive prices as determined by the structure of the 
market, coupled with (2) their apparent unwillingness to minimize their own 
risks, and (3) their actual profits being in excess of that needed to stay in 
business. Here, Netanel’s arguments move back and forth between the 
theoretical, the empirical, and the anecdotal. The market structure argument in 
turn derives from the reality that the market for copyright protected goods 
remains highly concentrated and the fact that several expressive works under 
protection are important enough (“iconic”) such that they are significantly less 
substitutable than other goods in general.123 This appears to be a largely 
descriptive claim. On industry risks and profits, however, Netanel’s claims 
seem to rely more on anecdote and speculation. He thus notes that while 
copyright industries do face great risks with their investments, they have the 
means to “lessen and manage” such risks and sets out a few strategies that are 
well known in the industry.124 Similarly, on industry profits, he argues that 
copyright industries’ profit levels have been well above those of others. 
Particularly interesting here is his use of copyright industries’ rent-dissipating 
activities such as excessive spending on marketing, on celebrity authors and 
actors, and on government lobbying, to conclude that such behavior correlates 
positively with earning rents.125 
Having gone through these several steps, Netanel then offers a conclusion 
that is far more qualified and cautious than that suggested by the original 
argument about copyright’s prohibitive costs. He thus concedes that the 
analysis does not yield a yardstick to determine whether a price burden is 
“intolerable” and therefore prohibitive, but that it instead suggests delimiting 
 
121.  Id. at 125-27. 
122.  Id. at 128. 
123.  Id. at 131-35. 
124.  Id. at 136. 
125.  Id. at 138-39. 
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copyright “so that, on the margins, relatively more oppositional and 
nonmarket creative appropriation is permitted.”126 
While this conclusion may seem disappointing to some, it is vividly 
representative of the problems associated with economic claims about the 
copyright system, given the absence of a universally accepted baseline. The fact 
that Netanel takes us through these several steps to finally conclude that his 
argument “follows from a straight free speech policy trade-off” also points to 
the obvious incommensurability of several variables that are key to Netanel’s 
broader theory.127 Indeed, this incommensurability—the fact that these 
variables cannot be meaningfully compared along a uniform metric128—has 
long plagued copyright and free speech analysis, and is a reality perhaps worth 
acknowledging early on in the discussion so as to avoid having the reader 
believe that the answer can be derived empirically. 
The last of the three burdens Netanel identifies—the distributive burden—
develops his theory of speech distribution even further. In essence, the 
argument here is that since copyright tends to promote certain kinds of 
speech—namely, those that go through the market—entities best positioned to 
use the market tend to be favored by the system. This translates into greater 
concentration in media markets, where large conglomerates overwhelmingly 
control most copyrighted expression. These conglomerates in turn, argues 
Netanel, generally disfavor reformulations and transformative uses of their 
content and tend to view such uses as potential sources of revenue.129 While 
this represents a “static” phenomenon, the distributive burden also has a 
“dynamic” aspect to it, which involves media conglomerates deriving a 
competitive advantage in the overall expressive market and their use of 
copyright as a barrier against new entrants.130 Scholars have long documented 
the use of copyright by industry incumbents to foreclose competition from new 
 
126.  Id. at 140-41. 
127.  Id. at 141. 
128.  For more on the idea of incommensurability in legal analysis, see Richard Craswell, 
Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1998), 
which adopts a similar definition of the idea to Sunstein; and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994). As Sunstein 
explains, “Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a 
single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods 
are best characterized.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
129.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 144-46. 
130.  Id. at 147-53. 
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technologies of distribution.131 In the past, however, either Congress or the 
courts routinely recognized this, and developed solutions to minimize such 
control.132 The modern vision of Blackstonian copyright by contrast, Netanel 
argues, actively encourages copyright’s use as an entry barrier, and given that 
courts and legislators have themselves actively contributed to this vision, they 
are unlikely to see this as problematic. 
In some ways, the distributive burden, at least in its static dimension, 
seems to be an inevitable consequence of copyright’s structural function. The 
structural function, one might recollect, entails the free expression system 
using the market to support a set of creators who would otherwise have to 
depend on either the government or elites for support.133 It thus relies on the 
market to produce a democratic outcome: a multiplicity of speakers, or 
expressive diversity. While market and democratic ideals often reinforce each 
other, they can be in conflict too.134 The distributive burden is one area where 
this is most apparent. Vertically integrated media conglomerates that are best 
positioned to use the market tend to dominate and exercise greater control. As 
with any competitive market, here too are clear winners and losers. 
Blackstonian copyright certainly allows the dominant participants to further 
entrench their position. All the same, one suspects that it is not the only reason 
for the burden, which is largely a consequence of the inevitable 
market/democracy tradeoff. 
B. Trimming Away Copyright’s Blackstonian Influence 
In Copyright’s Paradox, Netanel makes a convincing argument that a 
Blackstonian vision of copyright is indeed a major reason for copyright’s recent 
expansions and that these expansions exacerbate the structural tension between 
copyright and free speech. Yet when he moves to describing his proposals to 
check this expansionist trend and alleviate the structural tension, his focus 
shifts away from minimizing the influence of Blackstonian essentialism to 
scaling copyright back. In his view, the “shared goal of copyright and the First 
Amendment is best furthered by charting a middle ground between 
 
131.  For some prominent work expounding on this idea, see Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry 
Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002); and Timothy Wu, 
Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004). 
132.  See Wu, supra note 131, at 280, 297-324. 
133.  See supra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
134.  For more on this conflict, see ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 173-79 (1998); and Owen 
M. Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 908 (1992). 
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Blackstonian copyright and no copyright.”135 While his proposals are 
independently meaningful, they remain directed at minimizing the consequences 
of property essentialism—that is, Blackstonian thinking—rather than at 
minimizing its very causes. Thus, while they are likely to remedy the effects of 
Blackstonian copyright, they do little to move copyright thinking itself away 
from Blackstonianism. 
Structurally, Netanel offers two sets of reform proposals. The first applies 
First Amendment doctrine directly to copyright in order to limit its scope, 
while the second set uses the more general set of free expression values to 
recast copyright in the “First Amendment’s image.”136 The discussion of his 
first set here focuses on two of his boldest claims—one relating to the First 
Amendment as a check on copyright’s distributive role, and the other on its 
interface with fair use. 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,137 the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment 
challenge to Congress’s attempt to extend copyright’s term retroactively by 
twenty years. While the Court rejected almost all of the petitioners’ arguments, 
Netanel argues that among other things, the Court might have examined the 
extension as a “rent-distribution statute,” which operates at the expense of the 
public.138 Since the extension’s direct beneficiaries were media industry 
incumbents, it was, in his analysis, a “doling out [of] speech entitlements to 
well-heeled organized interests at the expense of the speech of the citizenry,” 
which should have triggered heightened scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.139 
There is of course little doubt that the extension at issue in Eldred was a 
product of special interest group lobbying.140 But has not this been historically 
true of all copyright lawmaking, as Netanel himself acknowledges previously? 
In Netanel’s analysis, all of copyright impacts speech distribution in some way, 
given that it ultimately works to the advantage of those best positioned to use 
market forces for their expression.141 Consequently, every instance of copyright 
legislation, barring those introducing limitations and exceptions to its grant of 
exclusivity, inevitably will have distributive consequences that can be 
characterized as rent seeking. Netanel’s model thus would place the burden on 
 
135.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 168. 
136.  Id. at 169-72, 195-96. 
137.  537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2003). 
138.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 182. 
139.  Id. at 182-83. 
140.  See LESSIG, supra note 67, at 218. 
141.  See NETANEL, supra note 11, at 118-19. 
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Congress in each instance to demonstrate that the legislation serves a 
substantial government purpose and was narrowly tailored to minimize its 
impact on speech. 
In effect, then, this speech distribution argument would subject all 
copyright legislation to intermediate scrutiny since it derives largely from the 
structural reality that copyright will always impact someone’s speech. In Eldred, 
the speech distributive effect was certainly most obvious, but in Netanel’s 
understanding, all of copyright law inevitably will have some distributive 
impact.142 Does this imply that the First Amendment requires heightened 
scrutiny of all copyright law, including the law currently in existence?143 
Indeed, in Eldred, one of the concerns motivating the Court appeared to be its 
belief that the petitioners’ arguments required them to review all copyright 
legislation that had been passed by Congress. Netanel does not seem to suggest 
that, which makes his argument here somewhat unclear. It might have helped 
if Netanel had connected this argument more directly to his analysis of 
copyright’s distributive burden and in the process proposed tentative limits to 
its wider application. 
In addition to holding that any alteration to copyright’s “traditional 
contours” would invite closer First Amendment scrutiny, the Court in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft also observed independently that copyright’s internal safeguards could 
be construed to “accommodate First Amendment concerns.”144 Netanel uses 
this observation to argue that the First Amendment should be brought to bear 
directly on the fair use analysis.145 I agree with Netanel that the fair use 
doctrine should be interpreted and applied as an application of the First 
Amendment. But why then should not all of copyright be interpreted and 
applied as instantiating a broader policy purpose, including perhaps the ones 
that Netanel identifies? If courts can and should give effect to copyright’s 
underlying free speech values via the fair use doctrine, why should not they do 
so more broadly in their approach to copyright in general?146 I revisit this issue 
 
142.  Id. at 182. 
143.  In recent work, others have suggested a strong position along these lines, deriving from an 
absolutist view of the First Amendment. See, e.g., DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, 
NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(2008). 
144.  537 U.S. 186, 221 & n.24 (2003). 
145.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 191. 
146.  Indeed, the footnote that Netanel relies on as authority for this approach seems to make it 
clear that the accommodation can extend beyond the fair use inquiry to a declaratory action 
as well—that is, to the very question of whether something is covered by copyright’s 
entitlement. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 n.24. 
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in Part IV. It suffices to say here that Netanel’s approach to fair use is thus a 
welcome, albeit limited, attempt to have courts reconceptualize copyright 
doctrine in terms of its underlying purpose and away from Blackstonian 
rhetoric. 
Netanel’s approach to fair use would now have courts interpret the 
transformative use exception more broadly, to exempt reformulations and 
creative appropriations whenever the defendant adds value in furtherance of 
“creative, critical, communicative, or informational objectives.”147 Secondly, it 
would have the burden of proof shift back to the plaintiff, once a colorable 
claim of fair use is made out.148 This, Netanel argues, will minimize the self-
censorship and overdeterrent effects of the current copyright system. Lastly, in 
situations where the plaintiff eventually succeeds, but the defendant’s claim of 
fair use is “colorable,” it would award only damages rather than injunctive 
relief.149 What Netanel does not tell us through all of this, though, is when a 
fair use claim is truly colorable. A colorable claim is normally understood as one 
that “is legitimate and that may reasonably be asserted, given the facts 
presented and the current law,” or “a reasonable and logical extension or 
modification of the current law.”150 In this broad understanding, then, virtually 
any assertion of the fair use doctrine would be colorable.151 The idea of a 
colorable fair use claim is usually traced back to the Court’s decision in 
Campbell, where it cautioned against the automatic grant of injunctive relief in 
situations where a “reasonable contention[] of fair use” is made by the 
defendant.152 While later courts occasionally have relied on the idea of a 
colorable fair use defense,153 their failure to accord it any additional meaning 
makes relying on it as a possible limit somewhat unhelpful. 
 
147.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 191. 
148.  Id. at 192. 
149.  Id. 
150.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (8th ed. 2004). 
151.  For an empirical analysis of how frequently the fair use analysis is invoked in copyright 
litigation, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 623 (2008) (observing that in a significant number of copyright 
cases, courts are called upon to determine whether the defendant’s actions constitute fair 
use). 
152.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1993). 
153.  See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001); Castle 
Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998); Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
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While Netanel seems willing to have courts interpret fair use to 
accommodate the First Amendment, he at the same time seems concerned with 
giving courts too much to do, which perhaps hints at why he seems to disfavor 
having courts tinker around with more than just fair use. He appears 
sympathetic to Judge Posner’s reluctance to have courts introduce First 
Amendment concerns into the copyright calculus,154 noting that his approach 
does not “add[] a layer of fact-specific, case-by-case First Amendment analysis” 
and requires courts to “peel back copyright’s recent expansion, not 
fundamentally modify traditional copyright doctrine.”155 This last concession 
sits somewhat uneasily with the colorable fair use approach he advocates, 
which clearly seems to require a fact-specific analysis. Additionally, if copyright 
is to accommodate its underlying purposes, including those that derive from 
the First Amendment, it necessarily requires courts to introduce new variables 
into the current equation. While this may make the process somewhat more 
complex than the current one, it remains perfectly consistent with the rather 
unique role of courts in the overall copyright schema. 
Netanel’s second set of proposals by contrast set out to remake copyright to 
facilitate its functioning as an engine of free expression. Here, while Netanel 
attempts to minimize copyright’s propertarian influence, his focus is mostly on 
the issue of remedies.156 In a host of areas, Netanel proposes replacing 
copyright’s traditional property rule protection with liability rules, through 
either a judicially or statutorily imposed compulsory licensing mechanism. In 
each of these areas, the royalty determination would derive not from a market 
bargain metric, but rather from the idea of a “fair return” to the creator. Thus, 
in relation to the adaptation right, he proposes limiting a defendant’s liability 
in making a derivative to a “judicially determined compulsory license” equal to 
the amount of profits attributable to the underlying work.157 Similarly, in 
relation to noncommercial uses such as file sharing, he proposes charging 
 
154.  See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2003). 
155.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 193. 
156.  Netanel does propose two additional changes independent of the liability-rule-related ones. 
First, he argues that anticircumvention measures that block privileged uses should be 
prohibited, or that the law should allow individuals to circumvent protection measures in 
order to engage in such uses. Id. at 213-15. Second, he proposes giving authors limited moral 
rights protection in the nature of a right of attribution, which would require uses of original 
expression to indicate the speaker’s identity. Id. at 215-17. Since neither of these changes 
impact the Blackstonian vision of copyright that the book targets, I do not focus on them 
here. 
157.  Id. at 198. 
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providers whose profits depend on such uses a statutorily determined fee, a 
“noncommercial use levy”, set as a percentage of their gross revenue.158 
Property rights and property rules do often go together.159 Exclusionary 
remedies such as injunctions are thought to give effect to an owner’s right to 
exclude, in turn central to property. Yet property and the right to exclude mean 
more than just an entitlement to exclusionary relief.160 As discussed before, 
property essentialism, the principal contributor to copyright’s recent 
expansions, derives largely from the mere characterization of an identifiable 
resource as someone’s property and of someone’s rights over it as “property 
rights.” Eliminating property rules in favor of liability rules weakens the way in 
which a property right is enforced by the legal system but is likely to have little 
impact on the characterization of the right as a property right—the very 
characterization from which essentialism begins to influence the direction of 
the law. The case of trespass to chattels aptly illustrates this point. The 
common law of trespass to chattels today does not enable the owner of a chattel 
to sue another for a mere physical interference with the chattel unless the 
interference does actual harm to the chattel, in which case the law allows the 
owner to recover damages from the wrongdoer.161 The law thus clearly prefers 
ex post liability rule protection to property rule protection here. Yet, this does 
little to influence the law’s (and indeed the layperson’s) conception of chattels 
as property that can be owned, just like any other. Just as people avoid 
trespassing over others’ land, they avoid coming into contact with others’ 
movable property. The norms that the institution of property revolves around 
then can be largely indifferent to the remedies available to an owner for 
property infractions. 
Property rule protection is thus a consequence of a right being identified as 
a property right, rather than a cause for it.162 Hence, property rule protection in 
 
158.  Id. at 208. Netanel advocates a similar position for digital archives. See id. at 211. For an 
elaboration of this idea, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To 
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 35 (2003). 
159.  For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Henry E. Smith, Property and Property 
Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004). 
160.  This point was reaffirmed most recently by the Supreme Court in its decision involving 
injunctive relief in patent cases. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 
(2006) (“[T]he creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of 
that right.”). 
161.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965). For more on this feature of trespass to 
chattels, see Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69 
(2005). 
162.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 381 (2001). But see Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The 
BALGANESH PREOP 5/27/2009 5:50:06 PM 
debunking blackstonian copyright 
1161 
 
the form of injunctive relief can be obtained for rights that are not necessarily 
considered property rights in the essentialist sense.163 Liability rules are 
therefore unlikely to move copyright doctrine away from its reliance on 
Blackstonian thinking altogether on their own. Indeed, one suspects that 
focusing entirely on the remedial implications of the right might exacerbate the 
use of propertarian logic at the nonremedial level, through the use of self-help 
measures and perhaps by effectively widening the scope of copyright’s 
exclusive rights bundle, with the essentialist logic there remaining untouched. 
Moving copyright away from its reliance on property rules and toward a 
system of liability rules is undoubtedly a move in the right direction. The 
concern is not that this shift is misdirected, but rather that it does not follow 
from a vision of copyright that requires it. By glossing over the propertarian 
influences in copyright’s substantive elements and looking exclusively to their 
impact at the remedial level, Netanel’s proposals leave unanswered the broader 
question of why copyright should rely on liability rules, if its substantive 
structure seeks to mimic tangible property. In other words, if copyright is an 
ownership interest like any other—a premise left unaltered—the introduction 
of liability rule protection for certain elements seems to flow from reasons 
largely exogenous to copyright and its purpose. But this clearly is not the case, 
since Netanel’s proposals all seem to originate in copyright’s underlying 
purpose and in his attempt to “remake” it to serve that purpose. 
What Netanel’s proposals thus need, before moving to the issue of 
remedies, is a conception of copyright that offers an alternative to the 
Blackstonian vision that his prior analysis describes. For copyright to be seen as 
a “limited federal grant designed to further a particular public purpose,”164 we 
need a theory that describes its structure and functioning in distinctively 
non-Blackstonian terms. Such a theory would have to make sense of 
copyright’s structure as a bundle of exclusive rights but take seriously its 
instrumental origins and goals. Indeed the Blackstonian conception, as noted 
earlier, takes root in copyright’s promise of “exclusivity.” Consequently, until 
we disaggregate copyright’s structure in non-Blackstonian terms, such that its 
 
Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091 (1997) (equating 
property rights and property rules). 
163.  This connection seems to have originated in the ancient rule that equitable relief, such as an 
injunction, was available only for rights that the common law characterized as “property 
rights.” With time, the scope of what constituted a property right came to expand 
significantly and the distinction between property and personal rights soon collapsed 
altogether. For more on this, see Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and 
Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916). 
164.  NETANEL, supra note 11, at 6. 
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reliance on liability rules seems to flow directly from its structure, function, 
and purpose, the mere move to remuneration mechanisms will remain largely 
piecemeal and incomplete. In the next Part, I offer what I believe might be just 
such an alternative, non-Blackstonian conception of copyright and its reliance 
on exclusivity—and postulate that if this conception is taken seriously, 
Netanel’s blueprint might be well positioned to move copyright away from 
essentialist thinking in the short and long term. 
Two important caveats need to be made. First, it might well be that 
Netanel’s proposals implicitly, but nonetheless consciously, reject offering such 
an alternative conception. My attempt is not to argue that Netanel’s blueprint 
in Copyright’s Paradox necessarily requires such a conception, but rather that it 
is likely to seem more cogent and meaningful when viewed through the lenses 
of the alternative conception. Second, it bears emphasizing that the alternative 
conception that I argue is needed is not directed at simplistically rejecting 
property metaphors or the use of “property” to describe copyright. It only 
rejects the Blackstonian version of property essentialism that ignores the 
institution’s purpose and origins once brought into existence. To the extent 
that the ideas of property and ownership cease to be autonomous conceptions 
in and of themselves and can be viewed as instrumentally driven, my 
normative account remains perfectly compatible with them. 
iv.  copyright as a common law entitlement 
How then should we understand the institution of copyright, in order to 
move it away from its reliance on Blackstonian essentialism? For some time 
now, scholars have debated whether copyright is indeed a form of property.165 
My objective here is not to add to this debate, for I believe that much inevitably 
depends on how one characterizes the institution of property to begin with. 
Rather, I hope to show that copyright can be understood as a strongly 
conditional ownership interest in creative expression; where the existence and 
scope of the interest can only ever be understood contextually and purposively, 
and thus by a court. In this respect, it closely resembles the way in which 
entitlements are created and enforced by common law courts in other contexts. 
Placing sufficient reliance on the conditional nature of its entitlement structure 
is thus likely to dilute the influence of property essentialism within copyright 
 
165.  For some representative literature documenting this debate, see Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990); Gordon, Inquiry, 
supra note 8, at 1354-88; Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, 
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006); and Mark A. Lemley, 
Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997) (book review). 
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law. What this in turn needs, however, is for courts to reconceptualize their 
roles in the copyright system and recognize that adjudicating copyright 
infringement claims entails more than just interpreting a statutory enactment. 
In this Part, I outline the direction this might take. 
A. Common Law Adjudication 
Before proceeding to establish how copyright can be conceived of as a 
process of common law decisionmaking, this Section sets out what I believe are 
three central and interdependent features of the common law process that are 
most relevant to understanding copyright law’s structure.166 
I should offer one important preliminary point, though, before moving 
forward. Even though common law adjudication may have originated in a 
world with few statutory enactments, the idea of common law adjudication as 
it exists today clearly contemplates the existence of statutes. This is especially 
so in the federal context, where statutory law has long remained the dominant 
source of legal rules. My discussion thus focuses on the common law method 
as it interacts with, and indeed often originates in, statutory directives, given 
the realities of copyright’s modern landscape. Common law adjudication of 
this kind is seen most conspicuously in the context of statutes that are 
understood to be “common law statutes.”167 Common law statutes are those in 
which Congress does little more than declare an important public policy in 
“sweeping, general terms,” leaving it to courts to “mold the contours of that 
policy,” in the process fashioning and refashioning rules as circumstances 
demand.168 Central, then, to much of modern common law adjudication as it 
operates in a world dominated by statutes is the identification of a statute as a 
common law statute, by its apparent delegation of lawmaking power to courts. 
While some have argued that such a delegation to courts presents obvious 
constitutional problems under the nondelegation doctrine, common law 
 
166.  For some pioneering work outlining the features of common law decisionmaking, see ALAN 
BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); 
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988); and KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE 
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). 
167.  For some pessimism about this characterization, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling 
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1392 (1988), which suggests that most statutes may be 
called “common law statutes, to the extent that they have gaps and ambiguities which 
Congress fully expects the judiciary to fill.” 
168.  Id. at 1377. 
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adjudication under statutory regimes nonetheless continues to remain a reality 
of today’s legal landscape.169 
1. The Role of Courts 
The process of common law decisionmaking, or the common law method 
as some refer to it, is characterized by the central role of courts in the overall 
lawmaking process. Courts see themselves as doing more than just applying 
and enforcing laws enacted by legislatures. They actively create new rules in 
the process of applying and interpreting existing rules.170 Now the distinction 
between interpreting an existing rule and molding it into a new one is, of 
course, often less than obvious. Yet it is seen most clearly when courts find 
themselves at complete liberty to develop rules that have no independent basis 
in the text of a statute, and later to adapt, reformulate, and indeed abrogate 
these rules as circumstances demand. In addition, these court-made rules are 
often justified by reference to moral, economic, social, or political values that 
courts see as qualifications to, or as deriving from, statutory texts.171 
Theorists of the common law often make a distinction between interstitial 
and independent common law. The former involves courts filling gaps in 
statutory provisions to suit the circumstances of the case before them, in the 
recognition that there remain things that a legislature could not have 
contemplated. In the latter, by contrast, courts function as active participants in 
the lawmaking process, as “partners with other law-making institutions” in the 
legal system.172 Melvin Eisenberg refers to this as the distinction between the 
“by-product” and “enrichment” models of the common law and notes that the 
latter is clearly more representative of what American common law courts 
routinely do.173 In this latter conception of the common law, courts take the 
broadly worded statutory language and its underlying policy or purpose as 
beginning points for their analysis, and then develop a set of rules that they 
mold and adapt over time as circumstances necessitate.174 In so doing, they 
 
169.  See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 461 (2008). 
170.  See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1989) (book 
review). 
171.  Id. at 456. 
172.  Id. at 457. 
173.  EISENBERG, supra note 166, at 6-7. 
174.  William Eskridge, for instance, refers to this process as “dynamic statutory interpretation.” 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481 
(1987). 
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thus explicitly enter the world of policymaking, ordinarily thought to be vested 
in the legislative branch. The Sherman Antitrust Act is perhaps the best-known 
example in which this process has occurred repeatedly over the course of the 
last century. Thus the primary feature of the common law method is the 
primacy of courts in lawmaking and policymaking in a given area. 
2. Bipolarity/Correlativity 
An overwhelmingly large portion of common law adjudication involves 
disputes between two private parties—referred to as private law. Bipolarity 
remains an important feature of private law and in turn refers to the reality that 
the adjudicative process connects two parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, 
solely through the idea of liability.175 One party thus alleges an interference 
with a right, or a breach of a duty, by the other and the court affirms those 
rights or duties and awards a remedy for their infraction or breach.176 In 
addition, in a bipolar structure the reasons why the law recognizes the 
plaintiff’s right and the defendant’s duty remain the same and derive from the 
same source. In other words, the plaintiff’s right is made up entirely of the 
defendant’s duty or a breach of the same. This idea in turn is referred to as 
“correlativity,” and originates in the idea of corrective justice.177 Correlativity is 
best seen in tort law. A victim’s right in a negligence action, for instance, 
derives entirely from the defendant’s duty of care and the breach of it, both of 
which in turn originate in the principle of corrective justice. 
Bipolarity and correlativity thus require connecting one party’s entitlement 
to another’s actions through the purpose for which the law recognizes the 
entitlement.178 They thus emphasize the reality that independent of a 
 
175.  This is also referred to by some as the common law’s “bilateral” structure. In this discussion, 
I use the ideas of bipolarity, bilateralness, and correlativity to derive from a common source. 
See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A 
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 294 (2007) (“[T]he 
common law is committed to a particular kind of bilateral structure . . . [which] explains 
why plaintiffs are awarded judgments only against the particular defendants who harmed 
them, rather than against society as a whole, and why defendants are ordered to pay 
damages only to the plaintiffs they harmed, rather than to a general social pool.”). For a 
discussion of the idea in the context of tort law, see PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT 
LAW 11-12 (1997); and ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1 (1995). 
176.  WEINRIB, supra note 175, at 10. 
177.  Id. at 117. 
178.  Id. 
BALGANESH PREOP 5/27/2009 5:50:06 PM 
the yale law journal 118:1126   2009 
1166 
 
defendant, there is no entitlement, or, as one scholar puts it, there is “no 
concept of negligence ‘in the air.’”179 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, correlativity also emphasizes 
that the remedy that the law chooses to give effect to this connection between 
the plaintiff’s right and the defendant’s duty, itself originates in the reasons for 
the liability. Thus, where the basis of the liability is the principle of corrective 
justice, courts need to allow this to inform their choice of remedy.180 
3. Incrementalism 
The third feature of the common law process derives from the second. 
Since courts can only make law in the limited context of the dispute before 
them, the process through which they create, modify, expand, and occasionally 
abrogate rules happens gradually.181 Given that courts apply any rule that they 
develop to the parties before them, the extent to which they can and are willing 
to make radical deviations from existent rules is necessarily limited. This is not 
to imply that courts are unaware that their decisions will have implications for 
future disputes in a common law context. It only means that the common law 
system is premised on the belief that in determining the “best” result in the 
case at hand, courts will also lay down a rule that is independently socially 
desirable.182 
Just as bipolarity is often a strategic reason for a common law delegation, 
so, too, is the incrementalism inherent in the process—especially in situations 
where a context-specific narrow entitlement is preferable to a broad, uniform 
one that is likely to be either underextensive or overextensive.183 Uniform 
entitlements, much like bright-line rules, are undesirable in a host of areas, and 
 
179.  CANE, supra note 175, at 12. 
180.  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 1 (2000). 
181.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1870) (“It is the merit of the common law [process] that it decides the case first and 
determines the principle afterwards.”). 
182.  See EISENBERG, supra note 166, at 4-7; Schauer, supra note 170, at 458 (noting how this is 
often taken for granted). More recently, however, Frederick Schauer argued that this twin 
process is intrinsically problematic, since judges are driven by cognitive biases that result in 
their compromising one for the other. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006). 
183.  See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1124 
(1987) (noting how diversity may be preferable to uniformity in a variety of situations 
where a common law statute is employed). 
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the common law method, analogous to a standards-based process allows courts 
to expand or contract a rule as circumstances demand. 
The interplay of these three features—courts as principal lawmakers, the 
bipolarity and correlativity of the adjudicative process, and the incremental 
development of rules—characterizes much of common law adjudication. They 
each have implications for the way in which we might understand copyright’s 
structural and functional attributes. 
B. Making Sense of Copyright’s Structure 
Copyright law involves a form of common law adjudication. Its distinctive 
structural features internalize attributes of the common law identified above. 
Two of them deserve special attention. 
1. The Copyright Act as a Common Law Statute 
Common law statutes, as mentioned previously, are characterized by their 
delegation of both the lawmaking and law-enforcing functions to courts. The 
legislature specifies a broadly worded policy directive in the actual statute, 
which courts are then meant to develop correlatively and incrementally. 
Common law statutes in the modern context entail a little more complexity 
beyond this generic description. 
In the context of intellectual property statutes, some scholars draw a 
further distinction within the category of common law statutes between those 
that adopt common law rules previously developed by courts and those that 
attempt to create a new policy but leave it to courts to shape and develop 
contextually.184 The former category, instead of attempting to say something 
new, merely attempts to endorse a set of rules developed by courts.185 The 
Copyright Act, in this understanding, represents a delegation to courts, but 
involves a mix of these two purposes.186 Some of its provisions, such as the fair 
use doctrine or the idea/expression dichotomy, merely codify rules developed 
 
184.  See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 196-97 
(2004) [hereinafter Leval, Trademark]; see also Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (2002) (arguing that courts should do more than just interpret 
the text of the copyright statute narrowly); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 87, 100-01 (2004) (noting how the 1976 Copyright Act “recognized the role that courts 
had been playing in tailoring the scope of the property entitlement in a common-law-like 
manner”). 
185.  See Leval, Trademark, supra note 184, at 196-97. 
186.  See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2:8, at 2-14 (2008). 
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independently by courts in the past. Others represent Congress’s attempt to set 
out new policy, but delegate its working to courts.187 The Copyright Act is thus 
structured largely as a common law enactment. 
Theory apart, courts play a major role in developing the rules of the 
copyright system and occasionally generate altogether new rules. They have 
created new exceptions and limitations to copyright’s entitlement,188 and 
expanded copyright’s liability structure,189 without any textual basis. This 
phenomenon, which has continued into the digital age, can only be understood 
as a direct recognition that the copyright statute represents a common law 
delegation to courts. The delegation may not be as direct as in the antitrust 
context in which courts have explicitly recognized it,190 given that Congress has 
over the years attempted to make changes to the statute and introduced 
complex regulatory mechanisms to deal with specific situations.191 All the same, 
the bulk of copyright law’s core today is judge made. Indeed, several rules that 
courts routinely apply during the copyright adjudicatory process find no 
mention at all in the text of the statute, yet without them the process would 
look very different.192 
2. Copyright as a Bipolar Entitlement 
Unlike its cousins, trademark and patent law, copyright law is characterized 
by the absence of an administrative agency overseeing a formal grant-making 
process. In the patent context, for example, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) scrutinizes an inventor’s application for a patent 
and once satisfied that the invention meets a set of requirements, makes a 
formal grant which specifies with a high level of detail the precise boundaries 
of the patentee’s grant.193 The patent thus functions in much the same way as a 
land title deed, with the land and its boundaries surveyed and described in 
great detail. So it is with trademarks. Consequently, when courts are called 
 
187.  Id. 
188.  See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (laying down the 
defense of “substantial non infringing use[]” to copyright infringement). 
189.  See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 912 (2005) (introducing contributory 
liability for inducing copyright infringement). 
190.  See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997). 
191.  See PATRY, supra note 186, § 2:8, at 2-14; Liu, supra note 184, at 105-29. 
192.  The most prominent of these is the test of “substantial similarity.” 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 58, § 13.01[B], at 13-8. 
193.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 131, 151, 154 (2000). 
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upon to enforce the entitlement, they tend to place much reliance on the fact 
that an administrative agency independently scrutinized the plaintiff’s 
eligibility for the entitlement.194 Hence, courts at best share the function of 
scrutinizing a claimant’s basis for the entitlement with the agency making the 
grant. 
Copyright law operates very differently.195 When a work is created, its 
creator obtains a set of exclusive rights in relation to the work. Yet, given the 
absence of a formal grant specifying the boundaries of the entitlement, at this 
stage the entitlement is only ever understood in general, sweeping terms. 
When this entitlement is sought to be enforced against a defendant, courts are 
called upon to validate and delineate the entitlement for the first time.196 All 
the same, given the centrality of copying, they can only ever do so by reference 
to the defendant’s actions and never in the abstract.197 Courts thus define the 
entitlement by reference to the plaintiff’s contribution and the defendant’s 
actions. The copyright statute does little more than give a creator a right to 
commence an action for copying in much the same way as the law of 
negligence gives a victim the ability to initiate an action for injury sustained.198 
In both situations, the defendant’s actions are crucial to understanding the 
plaintiff’s right, without which it only ever exists in theory. 
A bipolar entitlement, as noted earlier, is characterized by its reliance on a 
defendant’s actions to define the scope and content of the entitlement 
contextually. The reasons for the plaintiff’s right are also the reasons why the 
defendant’s actions are deemed a wrong. This characteristic also explains why 
bipolar entitlements differ from constitutive ones such as real property 
ownership.199 Since the boundaries of the entitlement are only determined by 
 
194.  In the patent law context, courts are obligated to presume that the patent was validly 
granted by the USPTO. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007). 
195.  See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1177, 1180, 1184-87 (2000) (noting the existence of several differences between the two 
systems). Indeed, in the literature, copyright law’s features have resulted in it being viewed 
as an altogether independent paradigm, in opposition to that of patent law. See J.H. 
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 
(1994). 
196.  See Liu, supra note 184, at 100-01. 
197.  See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The Copyright 
Act forbids only copying.”); see also O’Rourke, supra note 195, at 1186 (noting the centrality 
of copying to copyright law). 
198.  Cf. Picker, supra note 60, at 283 (noting the similarity between copyright and tort law in this 
respect). 
199.  Cf. CANE, supra note 175, at 12 (discussing social security benefits). 
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reference to their infraction, their ability to influence individual behavior is 
necessarily more limited than it is for ownership interests with well-defined 
boundaries. Thus, when the USPTO issues a patent, its boundaries being 
specified in its claims, the patent serves as notice to inventors to avoid using 
the subject matter covered by the invention, deriving from the norm of 
inviolability, related to the right to exclude.200 An issued patent thus serves as a 
property right, a fact borne out in the property-patent analogy contained in the 
express language of the Patent Act.201 With bipolar entitlements, the original 
entitlement is described in broad, general terms, making their ability to 
influence exclusionary behavior minimal. It is precisely this attribute of 
copyright law that Justice Holmes was describing when he noted that it was an 
“extraordinary right” that operates “in vacuo,” restraining the “spontaneity of 
men” where none otherwise existed.202 
Thus, when copyright law grants a creator the “exclusive right to make 
copies” of the work, this means little more than that if and when someone else 
copies the work, the creator can commence an action claiming an interference 
with the exclusive right. Yet, until someone actually uses the work in a way 
that is understood to constitute “copying,” the entitlement remains abstract.203 
Copyright is thus a bipolar entitlement through which the plaintiff’s right 
correlates directly to the defendant’s actions, with both originating in the same 
underlying reason. In other words, the reason why a defendant is liable for 
copyright infringement is also the reason why the plaintiff or the creator has a 
copyright in the work. 
C. What Should Courts Do? 
The previous discussion logically leads us to the question of what turns on 
thinking of copyright law as a form of common law adjudication and its 
entitlement structure as bipolar in nature. At its simplest, it obviously entails 
 
200.  See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 
116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1795-96 (2007). 
201.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
202.  White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908). 
203.  It is worth noting that the mere transferability of a bipolar entitlement has little bearing on 
its bipolarity and correlativity, as with copyright. See Michael Abramowicz, On the 
Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 712-17 (2005) (describing how alienability is 
perfectly compatible with tort law’s correlativity). For a broader argument, see Robert 
Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 396-400 (1989), 
which describes how open-ended alienability of tort claims might result in efficient 
insurance and optimal deterrence. 
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courts recognizing that they have a far greater role to play in the overall system 
than is usually identified. Courts interpreting and applying the Copyright Act’s 
directives in the context of an individual dispute need to understand that their 
decisions derive from more than just the text of the statute and that giving 
effect to the Act’s underlying purpose is as much their prerogative as it is 
Congress’s.204 Copyright adjudication is both rulemaking and rule enforcing, 
in a contextual setting. In situations where courts conclude that a literal 
application of the statute would produce outcomes inconsistent with its 
purpose, they should develop mechanisms and devices to rationalize the 
process. While they have done so occasionally in the past,205 the failure to 
articulate their role within the system in clearer terms has undoubtedly resulted 
in a degree of restraint that has fueled the essentialist conception of copyright. 
Two important practical consequences flow from the previous discussion of 
copyright as common law—both of which should enable courts to take a more 
active role in giving effect to copyright’s underlying purpose. 
1. The Instrumentalism of Copyright’s Correlativity 
Copyright is a bipolar entitlement where the plaintiff’s right is defined and 
driven by the defendant’s actions. Correlativity, the normative component of 
bipolarity, additionally emphasizes that the reasons underlying the plaintiff’s 
right also specify the defendant’s duty.206 Much therefore depends on 
identifying these “reasons” and allowing them to inform both the liability 
structure and the remedial choice thereafter. 
In its traditional formulation, the theories of bipolarity and correlativity are 
premised on the idea that private law’s internal structure provides sufficient 
justification for liability.207 In other words, the private law system in question 
is deemed an autonomous entity with an inner intelligibility reflective of its 
purpose. Thus, the law’s use of formal concepts such as “duty of care” and the 
 
204.  This is obviously very different from their power to review Congress’s interpretation of 
copyright’s purpose, as contained in the Constitution. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court made 
clear that it possessed no such power and would indeed defer to Congress’s interpretation of 
its constitutional powers in this regard. See 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
205.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (developing a 
“transformative use” exception to copyright infringement); Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (reading a requirement of creativity into copyright law’s 
doctrine of originality); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 
2001) (using the First Amendment to deny a preliminary injunction). 
206.  See WEINRIB, supra note 175, at 120. 
207.  Id. at 3-14. 
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like appropriately give effect to the law’s reason or purpose in corrective justice 
that informs the tort law system. This conception thus forbids connecting 
liability to instrumental goals on which the regime is premised, in the belief 
that the regime’s internal devices are independently sufficient.208 
This autonomous conception of correlativity, however, fails to account for 
situations in which the liability regime’s internal devices themselves bear no 
connection to corrective justice. Thus the autonomous conception is hard-
placed to account for the persistence of various forms of strict liability torts in 
the common law, and indeed other situations where liability is imposed on 
individuals absent actual wrongdoing by them, such as vicarious liability.209 By 
forbidding any reference to the law’s instrumental goals, it forces the analysis 
to look within the contours of the law’s formal concepts for a justification. In 
addition, the autonomous conception often deploys the idea of property as an 
independently meaningful justification for liability.210 Yet by forbidding any 
inquiry into the reasons for characterizing any given interest as a property 
right, the autonomous conception effectively contributes to a vision of 
essentialism. Hanoch Dagan describes this phenomenon and notes that 
correlative entitlements often run the risk of blinding themselves to the social 
values central to a law by relying on property as an autonomous idea, which it 
is not.211 What Dagan describes in many ways represents precisely the 
mechanism by which Blackstonian essentialism has managed to entrench itself 
in copyright law. 
More importantly, the autonomous conception refuses to acknowledge that 
private law is, in the end, a form of coercion that like other uses of state 
authority needs to be justified as a mechanism of social control. Private law 
mechanisms enable individuals to invoke the state’s monopoly over legitimate 
force, without any reference to the broader policy or social reasons for the 
same.212 Yet, the very decision to allow such recourse to state coercion 
 
208.  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 
(1988); Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261 (1996) (reviewing ERNEST J. 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)). 
209.  See WEINRIB, supra note 175, at 171; Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of 
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1754 (1996) (noting the failure of 
corrective justice theories to account for vicarious liability). 
210.  See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 6-7 (2000). 
211.  Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 811-18 (2008); 
see Dagan, supra note 43, at 144-47. 
212.  For an elaboration on the relationship between private law and the state, see Symposium, 
Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 527 (2008). See also Dagan, supra 
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inevitably derives from a prior commitment to a set of core values. While these 
values may be exogenous to corrective justice, they remain far from irrelevant. 
An action is deemed “wrongful” and an enrichment “unjust” because they 
represent deviations from a state of affairs informed by these values. They may 
have little impact on the structure of the specific private law apparatus in 
question, but all the same they form the backdrop against which private law 
comes to exist.213 
Correlativity, though, is capable of being understood within a broader 
context. An institution can have exogenous goals and purposes, and corrective 
justice may be one mechanism it employs to realize them.214 These goals then 
form the context for the institution, within which the bipolar structure is 
understood. This is of particular significance to an institution’s reliance on 
property, for it draws attention to the fact that the ideas of property and 
ownership derive their justification independent of the bipolar/correlative 
structure, and instead from the broader social setting of which the institution is 
a part. Dagan emphasizes this point when he notes that any account of private 
law has to make sense of the bipolar structure by reference to both the law’s 
internal devices and the underlying social value (“instrumentalism”) on which 
they are premised.215 In this conception, correlativity is thus partly autonomous 
and party instrumental. 
Understood in this vein, courts should conceptualize the institution of 
copyright law in both autonomous and instrumental terms. Its autonomous 
nature derives from the reality that at base, copyright is a correlatively 
structured action for misappropriation. Liability turns on the defendant’s 
having copied or appropriated the plaintiff’s content, with such appropriation 
having both a factual and normative dimension that manifests itself doctrinally 
 
note 211, at 813 (observing that since private law is a coercive mechanism, it needs to also be 
a justificatory practice). 
213.  To Dagan, this foundation is principally distributive. See Dagan, supra note 43, at 139, 147-
54. To others this is to be found in the idea of morality. See Stephen A. Smith, Book Review, 
112 LAW. Q. REV. 363, 365 (1996) (observing how any attempt to justify private law must 
involve questions of morality). 
214.  For instance, Jules Coleman, a leading proponent of corrective justice in tort law, readily 
admits that the institution has a set of goals and purposes independent of the bilateral 
relationship between the parties. He thus notes that tort law is a mixture of “markets and 
morals.” See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 75 (1992); see also Stephen R. Perry, The 
Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 917, 917 (1992) (describing 
how Coleman’s theory accommodates tort law’s exogenous institutional goals). 
215.  Dagan, supra note 211, at 818-19. 
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during the infringement inquiry. The defendant’s appropriation thus forms the 
focal point of the inquiry.216 
All the same, focusing entirely on the defendant’s act of appropriation does 
not tell us why a particular defendant’s appropriation is the basis of liability in 
a specific case. In other words, why should a defendant’s copying be rendered 
actionable? Indeed, there is a reason why copyright law differs from the tort of 
misappropriation, which focuses exclusively on a defendant’s act of copying, to 
the exclusion of the content of such copying.217 Here, relying on property 
essentialism obscures the search for a normative baseline to which copyright’s 
bipolar structure attempts to restore the parties.218 So, too, would a perfunctory 
reference to the bare source of the directive—that is, the statute. The answer to 
the “why” question must instead be understood to derive from the institution’s 
overall purpose, from the fact that copyright is premised on providing creators 
with a market-based incentive for their creative expression and that an 
unauthorized appropriation interferes with that purpose. The focus on 
appropriation or copying tells us at what harm or interference the law is 
directed, but absent a reference to copyright’s underlying purpose, the baseline 
distribution to ascertain the harm becomes indeterminate. Copyright thus 
originates in an openly instrumental conception of corrective justice.219 
Distilled to basic terms, a court constructing a plaintiff’s copyright 
entitlement in the context of a dispute should therefore ask—taking the 
correlative nature of the entitlement seriously—(1) whether the defendant’s 
actions interfered with one or more of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights, as 
understood by the formal terms of the law, and (2) whether the defendant’s 
liability connects to the law’s exogenous reasons for the plaintiff’s entitlement. 
A court might choose to do this last step in one of several ways. It might 
develop an independent device to give effect to the law’s instrumentalism 
contextually (for example, “foreseeable copying”220), or it might simply read 
the law’s instrumentalism into its extant formal devices, such as fair use.221 
 
216.  2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 8.01[A], at 8-15. 
217.  See Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 622 (2003). 
218.  See Dagan, supra note 211, at 814-15 (“[R]eliance on the concept of property only obscures 
the distributive and expressive implications of this choice . . . .”). 
219.  See Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice, 78 VA. L. REV. 283, 284 (1992) 
(noting that pure corrective justice theory does little to explain the functioning of 
intellectual property without an independent normative account). 
220.  Elsewhere, I argue in great detail what this entails and how it might give effect to 
copyright’s instrumental purpose. See Balganesh, supra note 79. 
221.  See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
969 (2007) (developing a theory of “copyright harm” through the fair use doctrine). 
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Alternatively, it might indeed choose to do little more than recognize that the 
law’s correlative structure operates in furtherance of other social values, even if 
they don’t inform the bipolar nature of the legal inquiry.222 In all of these 
options, though, copyright’s purpose would come to inform its contextualized 
decisionmaking. 
2. Copyright as a Conditional Entitlement: The Model of Governance 
While emphasizing the bipolar and correlative nature of the copyright 
entitlement would allow courts to construct copyright’s entitlement structure 
by reference to its justificatory reasons, it does not quite provide them with a 
mechanism to balance the competing purposes that are often at play in 
copyright. This is likely to be particularly crucial given that copyright, as 
Netanel points out, is both an engine for, and a burden on, free speech. 
Recognizing an entitlement in a class of individuals may on the face of 
things seem like an absolute grant, where the only question is whether an 
individual before the court falls within the identified class. Yet the common 
law has long recognized entitlements, the very existence of which are 
conditioned upon a balancing of competing interests. Unlike situations in 
which a competing interest is made an exception to an entitlement granted, in 
these situations it becomes meaningless to speak of an entitlement until the 
balancing exercise is carried out. Nuisance law is paradigmatic of this 
approach. 
Under the common law of nuisance, courts regularly examine the 
defendant’s activity and attempt to balance the harms and benefits associated 
with it against the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of a resource.223 The balancing 
that occurs is an integral part of the entitlement-delineation process rather than 
a subsequent relaxation of the entitlement once granted. 
Henry Smith identifies this approach to entitlement delineation as the 
“governance strategy” and notes that it entails a granular inquiry into the 
 
222.  Weinrib, otherwise an advocate for an autonomous conception of correlativity, also admits 
that this option is indeed practicable and does little to erode the fundamental precepts of 
corrective justice, as long as it does not interfere with the bipolar structure of liability. See 
Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2002) (arguing 
that a tort law system premised on corrective justice can affirm deterrence as an institutional 
goal). 
223.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821F, 822 (1979); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 623 (5th ed. 1984); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 63 (7th ed. 2007). 
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specific uses to which a resource may be put.224 He contrasts this with the 
“exclusion strategy” where the entitlement is defined in simple “on/off” terms, 
delegating to resource owners the power to make the cost-benefit analysis 
themselves, in the enforcement of their entitlement.225 The exclusion strategy 
thus corresponds roughly to the idea of essentialism detailed previously in that 
it entails a very high level of deference to the owner’s decision. The governance 
strategy on the other hand usually sets out a broadly defined, vague 
entitlement that courts then give content to contextually. Instead of deferring 
to the entitlement holder, however, courts undertake a balancing exercise 
themselves. The governance strategy thus entails higher costs at the ex post 
stage, but these costs are offset by the benefits associated with having avoided 
an overbroad entitlement ex ante. Governance thus focuses on “rights in 
activities,” while exclusion focuses on “rights to things.”226 
Copyright law in many ways adopts what seems to be a distinctively 
governance-based approach to entitlement delineation.227 The point is not just 
descriptive, but rather normative. Copyright does adopt a governance-based 
approach, in light of its institutional objectives, and this should be taken 
further, again to adhere more strongly to those objectives. Given copyright’s 
common law structure and its competing purposes, a governance-based 
approach is a necessity. As a practical matter, courts adjudicating copyright 
claims should see themselves as balancing a set of competing interests 
contextually and weigh them in light of copyright’s institutional purpose. In 
situations in which recognizing the entitlement would result in an aggregate 
negative effect on free speech, courts should see themselves empowered to 
factor that into the entitlement-delineation process. It bears emphasizing that 
what they should be doing is factoring it into the very structure and purpose of 
the entitlement, rather than as an exception to the entitlement once created. 
This would thus condition the entitlement on there being a positive free speech 
effect—understood in terms of copyright’s free speech functions. It might thus 
entail having the plaintiff establish that copyright’s production function 
extends to restricting the defendant’s actions and that the costs imposed on the 
defendant’s speech are offset by the benefits of production. 
 
224.  Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Law of Nuisance]; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: 
Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) [hereinafter 
Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance]. 
225.  Smith, Law of Nuisance, supra note 224, at 973-74. 
226.  Id. at 971. 
227.  Smith, supra note 200, at 1807. 
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One might thus posit a free speech calculus of sorts (analogous to the 
utilitarian tradeoff undertaken in nuisance cases228) where copyright’s ability to 
further free speech, through its production function, represents its positive 
externality, and the burdens it imposes, a negative externality. When this 
tradeoff is positive—that is, the incremental benefits of copyright’s incentive 
framework outweigh its costs—liability should be found, and when negative it 
should be denied. This approach would differ from the one suggested and 
rejected by Judge Posner in that the calculus would operate at the substantive 
level rather than the remedial one; it would also differ from those coalescing 
free speech and fair use in that the free speech concerns would be part of the 
entitlement’s very purpose rather than just as an exception. In this conception 
of copyright, the First Amendment would be seen as according individuals not 
only a negative liberty but also an independent cause of action directed at 
furthering free speech values. 
As with any balancing exercise, this process will inevitably involve 
incommensurables, such as those that derive from the nature of the speech in 
question and additionally the circumstances of the parties, both of which point 
very clearly in favor of courts undertaking this inquiry contextually.229 
 
                                                    *     *     * 
 
To sum up, understanding copyright as a bipolar, common law entitlement 
presents us with an alternative to the Blackstonian vision of copyright as an 
unconditional ownership entitlement premised on the right to exclude. 
Focusing attention on the deep instrumentalism that is at the heart of its 
structure serves to move it away from the institution of property and toward 
being identified as a system of ex post liability. Copyright differs from other 
forms of rights traditionally characterized as “intellectual property rights” and 
 
228.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 & cmt. e (1979) (describing in detail the social 
utility-harm balancing test as used by courts in determining liability for nuisance). 
Additionally, the factors that courts use to undertake this balancing test seem to be relatively 
well established. See id. § 827 (setting out the factors courts use on the harm side of the 
calculus); id. § 828 (setting out the factors on the utility side). The calculus clearly 
incorporates elements of social value, the effects of which are likely to be seen only in the 
long term, similar to those involved in the tradeoff between copyright and free speech. See 
id. § 828 cmt. f (“There is no universal, fixed scale by which courts can measure the amount 
of social value that a particular purpose or objective has.”). 
229.  For a more general discussion of the idea of balancing in the law, see George P. Smith, II, 
Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic 
Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658 (1995). 
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this difference is more than just coincidental.230 It represents in many ways a 
structural alternative to the use of a property metaphor, one that should be 
seen as having significant functional implications. 
D. Circling Back to Netanel’s Blueprint 
Reconceptualizing copyright as a common law entitlement, characterized 
by its correlative and conditional nature, presents a viable alternative to 
Blackstonian essentialism. By emphasizing that its entitlement structure needs 
to be understood by reference to its underlying purpose, the common law 
model is likely to force courts to rely less on property as an autonomous 
concept to do the justificatory work for them. Additionally, the view of 
copyright just presented connects perfectly with Netanel’s blueprint by 
offering a bridge between the reasons he identifies for copyright’s recent 
expansion and the direction he seems to believe copyright should take. 
As noted earlier, the central feature of his proposals retain their reliance on 
the use of liability rules that are either judicially or statutorily created, in lieu of 
property rule protection.231 Copyright, in the correlative common law 
conception, represents an instrumental application of corrective justice. 
Correlativity requires that a court’s choice of remedy be driven by the need to 
correct the normative imbalance created by the defendant’s actions.232 The 
remedy thus has to derive from the reasons for the entitlement to begin with 
and attempt to track its operation to offset the defendant’s wrong. If 
copyright’s purpose then lies in providing creators with an incentive to use the 
market as a revenue source for their creative expression, an infringement 
represents a market failure. The failure thus lies in its interference with a 
creator’s ability to earn revenue and not, very importantly, with a creator’s 
despotism.233 This connects up directly with an award of damages rather than 
extraordinary relief. 
Just as there exists a logical continuity between the institution of property 
and property rules, liability rules flow directly from an entitlement structure 
 
230.  Mark Lemley has made a similar argument in relation to trade secret law, specifically 
comparing its ex post liability structure to that of copyright law. See Mark A. Lemley, The 
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 326 n.50 (2008). 
231.  See supra text accompanying notes 156-158. 
232.  See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 293 (1994). 
233.  See id. at 296-97. 
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that is principally correlative.234 Correlativity thus exhibits a clear preference 
for liability rules in the areas of tort, contract, and unjust enrichment.235 The 
reason for this also connects to another important attribute of the process 
discussed earlier: the need to fine-tune the entitlement and the remedy, both of 
which become especially difficult in situations that employ broad exclusionary 
remedies.236 It thus explains why governance strategies correspond strongly 
with liability rule protection.237 
Adopting this framework therefore leads us to where Netanel seems to 
want copyright to head, except that it additionally gives us a reason for it. 
Thinking of copyright as a conditional common law entitlement addresses the 
causes of copyright’s problematic expansions rather than its consequences, at 
which Netanel’s proposals are aimed. It thus offers a normative account of why 
copyright should not be headed in the direction it is, given its structural and 
functional attributes. In this way it forms a complement to Netanel’s focus on 
liability rules.238 
conclusion 
Copyright’s Paradox is fundamentally a story about a problem that is in 
many ways at the very heart of the copyright system—property essentialism—
and Netanel tells it in a way that is at once both deeply respectful of the 
institution and cognizant of its structural inadequacies. This is precisely what 
sets it apart from other recent work in the area, which often begin with 
normative priors that detract from the analytical objectivity that a project of 
 
234.  An overly simplistic characterization of the argument I have just been making would be to 
say that my alternative to proprietary copyright is one that derives from tort law. And, tort 
law, as is well known, is characterized and indeed defined by its reliance on liability rules. 
See Guido Calabresi, Toward a Unified Theory of Torts, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2007) (“[W]hat 
characterizes tort law is the liability rule.”). 
235.  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 55 (2003); Weinrib, supra note 180. 
236.  For a detailed argument along these lines, see Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should 
Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007), argues that the 
inability of courts to tailor property rule protection to the circumstances of the case before 
them militates in favor of liability rules. 
237.  See Smith, supra note 159, at 1753. 
238.  One important point of difference is worth noting here. What is not clear from Netanel’s 
analysis is why in some instances he prefers the liability rule system to come from Congress 
and not the courts. If part of the reason for the liability rule—that is, governance—system 
lies in its adaptability to individual circumstances, having Congress set it up does not seem 
to flow logically. Here, his proposals thus part company with my normative framework. 
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this nature demands. As a descriptive project, the book builds on Netanel’s 
prior work and offers a novel way of thinking about copyright’s purpose—a 
purpose that emphasizes the interconnectedness of copyright and the goals of 
democracy as contained in the First Amendment and elsewhere in the 
Constitution. Netanel makes an original and creative argument that copyright 
is in the end about speech, a reality that is ignored by courts, legislators, and 
scholars alike in their focus on its internal doctrines and seemingly 
autonomous nature. The book does an excellent job of taking the reader 
through the nuances of the copyright-free speech nexus. Netanel’s brevity and 
use of examples that resonate with the institution’s public perception are 
additionally laudable features. For these reasons alone, Copyright’s Paradox 
should be on the list of required reading for anyone concerned with the inner 
workings of the copyright system, and those interested in issues of institutional 
or regulatory design as they relate to public policy goals. 
My principal concern with the book lies in its goals as a normative project. 
A strong normative argument involves four analytically distinct stages: locating 
a problem, detailing its effects, identifying its cause, and finally offering a 
solution that is directed at the problem through its cause and consequences. 
Copyright’s Paradox no doubt tries to do all of the above. The problem it focuses 
on is copyright’s expansion, the cause for which is the increasingly proprietary 
or Blackstonian vision of copyright, and the consequence of which is an 
increased burden on speech. Nonetheless, the book’s solutions seem to focus 
entirely on remedying the consequences of the expansion and tend to ignore its 
cause. Netanel makes clear throughout the book that he does not favor the 
Blackstonian vision, but what he fails to do is explain his vision of a 
non-Blackstonian copyright. He no doubt hints at it in several places, when he 
describes copyright as a “limited federal grant,”239 but he does not tell us much 
beyond that. His proposals focus principally on the issue of remedies, 
attempting to convert copyright into a remunerative mechanism for authors 
and no more. But why indeed is copyright a simple remunerative mechanism 
as opposed to a full-blown property right, and are the two necessarily 
incompatible? In the world of intangible rights, we clearly seem to be moving 
toward recognition that property rules are no longer the unambiguously 
preferred option. If property’s right to exclude can accommodate liability rules, 
does this mean that copyright is indeed a form of property, deriving from the 
Blackstonian conception? If not, what remains the normative basis beyond the 
social costs of copyright’s expansion that gets us to liability rules? 
 
239.  See supra text accompanying note 164. 
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The institution of property operates on a set of norms that extend well 
beyond judicial remedies. And these norms seem to have entered the world of 
copyright as well, as epitomized most distinctively in the “clearance culture” 
and “self-censorship” that Netanel describes. What thus is not clear is how the 
move to liability rules is likely to address the nonremedial implications of 
Blackstonian copyright on its own. 
Netanel may indeed believe that liability rule regimes embody an internal 
intelligibility that obviates the need for an exogenous normative account of 
their use. In other words, liability rules themselves present an alternative to the 
Blackstonian account. And it may well be then that our point of disagreement 
revolves around this narrow point. As I argue, liability rules flow directly from 
the ideal of corrective justice, and unless copyright as an institution can be 
reconceptualized along those lines, they do not independently offer us an 
alternative to Blackstonianism. Copyright can be understood as a correlative 
common law entitlement, embodying an instrumental vision of corrective 
justice, and I have attempted to outline the structural and functional 
implications of having courts view copyright along these lines. Perhaps more 
importantly though, I believe that this view of copyright can get us to where 
Netanel seems to want copyright to develop—a system of remuneration for 
creativity. 
Copyright’s Paradox makes an enduring contribution to the literature, which 
is both topical today and will undoubtedly continue to remain so in the years to 
come. As should be apparent from the previous discussion, I agree with the 
broad premise of Netanel’s project and to the extent that I differ, my reasons 
derive from the need to accord it independent normative significance. Doing 
so, I hope, will wean copyright law away from its misplaced reliance on 
property rhetoric, and in the process focus attention more directly on the 
interdependent social, political, and economic purposes that it is meant to 
serve. 
